

**IS A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS STILL POSSIBLE? A
RECONSIDERATION OF THE GHALI 'SET OF IDEAS'**

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Is there any realistic hope that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities may still manifest the desire and political will to negotiate and eventually achieve a mutually acceptable settlement to the long-festering Cyprus problem, obtain the endorsement of the governments of Greece and Turkey as well as the United Nations, and proceed to forge together a common future? The two communities have been following divergent paths since 1974, if not 1963. The Republic of Cyprus is now going full steam ahead with the European Union accession talks and is doing all it can to harmonise its legislation, economic and administrative systems and trading practices with those of the EU. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whether or not it is referred to in inverted commas or in an ironic tone of voice, exists in complete independence from the Republic of Cyprus (but of course is completely dependent on Turkey) and works to promote ever closer political and economic links with Turkey, so that if the Republic of Cyprus joins the EU before there is a settlement, the TRNC will become to all intents and purposes a province of Turkey. Is there no hope of arresting this drift towards cementing the division of Cyprus into two hostile lands and peoples, in effect the Cyprus-based branches of Hellenism and the Turkish nation?

Since 1964, when the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus was overthrown and Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war, the United Nations apprised itself of the Cyprus problem, and tried to encourage the two communities, as well as Greece and Turkey, to work together for the re-constitution of the Cypriot state under terms acceptable to all interested parties. The Turkish invasion of July 1974, resulted in the partition of the island, the displacement of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part and the concentration of the Turkish Cypriot population in what later became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; but despite the repeated breaches of international law, the Security Council appeared to see the establishment of a just peace and security in terms of a negotiated settlement between the two Cypriot communities under which a new bicomunal Cypriot state would be set up. After February 1977, when President Makarios and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr Denktash

agreed on four guidelines for a negotiating procedure leading to a new package, the international community believed there now was a definite and acceptable end-game in view: a bicomunal, bizonal federation. The UN Security Council repeatedly authorised the Secretary-General to provide the auspices and offer guidance to the two sides, but a peaceful settlement remained elusive. From time to time, Secretaries-General put forward their own proposals for a Cyprus settlement which set out on every point of contention some median or other sort of compromise position. Thus Dr Kurt Waldheim brought out his 'Evaluation' paper at the end of 1981; Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar produced three major documents between January 1985 and March 1986, and his 'Food for Thought' in the summer of 1989; Dr Boutros Ghali presented his 'Set of Ideas' (including a map indicating territorial adjustments) in August 1992 and this received Security Council endorsement through resolution 774/92; and Mr Kofi Annan revived part of the 'Set of Ideas' and presented it through his Special Representative Mr Diego Cordobez to President Clerides and Mr Denktash in two abortive sets of meetings held at Troutbeck, New York State and Glion, Switzerland in the summer of 1997. All these UN papers provoked mixed reactions from the public opinions in the two communities. Since all these papers were intended to help the two sides to bridge the gap between them and proceed on that basis to develop the details of a compromise settlement, none of them could possibly give any one side all it wanted. Yet the result was that every one of the UN sets of proposals brought to the surface long-standing disagreements within each community between, on the one hand, those people who wanted to obtain all or nearly all the elements which, in their view, constituted a just solution, and on the other hand, those who believed that it was simply unrealistic to expect that negotiations could yield a package incorporating *only* elements demanded by them but rejected by the other side, and *no* elements rejected by them but demanded by the other side, and consequently both sides should moderate their respective demands and aim at a balanced and honourable compromise.

If a negotiated settlement is to be found in Cyprus, the two sides will have to discuss and finally reach agreement on a range of subjects, some of which may be more important to one side and some to the other. The Ghali 'Set of Ideas' proposed a framework of principles for a comprehensive negotiated settlement, and the principles were presented under eight headings reflecting the negotiating agenda, as follows:

(1) Preamble

- (2) Overall Objectives/Guiding Principles
- (3) Constitutional aspects of the federation
 - (a) Powers to be vested in the federal government
 - (b) Structure, composition and functioning of the federal government
 - (c) Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, social and cultural rights
- (4) Security and guarantees
- (5) Territorial adjustments
- (6) Displaced persons
- (7) Economic developments and safeguards
- (8) Transitional arrangements.

When the 'Set of Ideas' was presented to the two Cypriot sides in August 1992, it was accepted by the then Cypriot president George Vassiliou as a basis for reaching an overall settlement, but it was declared to be unacceptable as it stood by both Mr Glafcos Clerides - at the time leader of DESY party and planning to be a candidate in the presidential election of February 1993 - and also by Mr Rauf Denktash. Mr Clerides went to win the presidential election, but during his five-year term he did not have any real negotiations with Mr Denktash on the substance of the Cyprus problem, and he did not persuade the Security Council that there was a better framework of principles for a negotiated settlement in Cyprus than the 'Set of Ideas'; hence the revival of a section of the document by the UN in the abortive Clerides-Denktash meetings of summer 1997. In February 1998 President Clerides won a second term of office and declared himself ready for intensive efforts to reach a compromise settlement, but by then Mr Denktash had made it clear that he was not willing to enter into negotiations for a Cyprus settlement unless he was recognised as a head of a state, a condition which the Cyprus government and the United Nations rejected.

On 30 September 1998 the UN announced that the Secretary-General Mr Kofi Annan had asked his Deputy Special Representative in Cyprus Dame Ann Hercus, with the consent of President Clerides and Mr Denktash. "to develop a process for on-island contacts with the two sides, with the goal of reducing tension and promoting progress towards a just and lasting settlement". Once Dame Ann got down to work, the two Cypriot leaders knew they were going to be asked about their views on the various subjects forming the negotiating agenda. There was scarcely any reference to the Ghali 'Set of Ideas', but all indications suggest that

the international community still consider the proposals of this document - which are the development of many years of UN thinking on the Cyprus problem - as forming a reasonable basis for a just and lasting settlement. The question is whether President Clerides and Mr Denktash are going to repeat their respective views from 1992, or else appreciate the time is running out for a Cyprus settlement, lower their aspirations, show a degree of flexibility, take each other's needs and interests into account, and in the light of all that make balanced concessions to each other in order to allow a compromise to emerge. Probably both leaders have somewhere at the back of their minds fall-back positions on some at least of the points of disagreement, but it is impossible to know if they have the will to put them forward, especially as they are both surrounded by advisers and supporters characterised by maximalist tendencies. But *assuming* that this time they will prove wiser and more courageous than they did in the past, and display the will to reach a compromise, what form could this compromise take? How can the various areas of disagreement between the two sides be tackled in order to reach a settlement which both communities will be prepared to support in separate referendums?

It may be recalled that some time after the UN Secretary-General Dr Boutros Ghali brought out the 'Set of Ideas', he asked the two sides to state their respective reactions to each the various proposals set out in the document. He held discussions with President Vassiliou and Mr Denktash between 28 October and 6 November 1992 to ascertain their views, and on 11 November he brought out a paper entitled 'Summary of the Current Positions of the Two Sides in Relation to the Set of Ideas'. This paper represents the only attempt ever made by the UN to codify the positions of the two sides on various aspects of a Cyprus settlement, and wherein their points of agreement and disagreement lie. Indeed, it is a fair assumption that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions contained in the paper still express the views of the two sides, unless in the meanwhile President Clerides and Mr Denktash have put forward different views. So if the 'Set of Ideas' is still the UN frame of reference for intercommunal negotiations, the points of disagreement contained in the 'Summary' indicate the obstacles that need to be removed, if a compromise settlement can be achieved in Cyprus.

The **Preamble** to the 'Set of Ideas' is a short paragraph which was meant to be uncontroversial, beginning with the words "The leader of the Greek Cypriot community and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community have negotiated on an equal footing..." This text did not provoke any reactions in the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot sides in 1992.

However, eight years later Mr Denktash insists that the requirement of equality between the negotiating parties implies that he should be recognized by the UN as the president of a state, as is Mr Clerides. This would be unacceptable to Greek Cypriots, as indeed would be unacceptable to the international community. It is to be hoped that the two sides can resume negotiations and proceed to discuss their disagreements on the various aspects of a Cyprus settlement, without making initial demands on each other which cannot be met.

The section entitled **Overall Objectives** makes a number of points on the constitutional form of the state that is to be established as part of a Cyprus settlement, two of which are rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side while they are accepted by the Greek Cypriot side. The two points are:

- (1) ...A new constitution for Cyprus...will govern the relations of the two communities on a federal basis, that is, bicomunal as regards the constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards the territorial aspects.
- (2) ...The Cyprus settlement is based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two political equal communities...in a bicomunal and bizonal federation, and that the settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession.

The Greek Cypriot side have long insisted that international personality should be the exclusive property of the federation, and sovereignty should be accorded only to the Cypriot people as a whole, for they feared that if the federated states were allowed a *locus standi* under international law and the communities were deemed to be sovereign under the new constitution, the Turkish Cypriots would be in a position (and so possibly tempted) at some point in future to exercise the sovereign right to secede from the federation, declare the Turkish Cypriot federated state to be an independent republic, and as such ask for recognition from the international community and admission to the United Nations. The Turkish Cypriots' point of view on the matter is based upon their interpretation of the events of December 1963, which is that the Greek Cypriot leaders usurped or highjacked the power of the state against the provisions of the 1960 constitution, shut the Turkish Cypriots out of the machinery of the state, and got themselves accepted by the international community as the

government of the Cyprus Republic. Could this not happen again, the Turkish Cypriots ask, if the projected federal constitution does not grant any sovereign authority to the federated states? Further, the Greek Cypriots argue - and they believe the international community is on their side on this point - that there is at present only one sovereign state, the Republic of Cyprus, whose northern sector is under foreign control, and the question is how to reconstitute this state on federal lines; in other words, which powers to transfer to the federated parts. The Turkish Cypriots, however, believe the TRNC to be a real, live, sovereign and independent state, just like the Republic of Cyprus, in which case the real question is how much of this sovereignty and independence the two states are going to transfer to a system of joint organs which will form the federation. Thus the Turkish Cypriot position with regard to the guiding constitutional principles of the 'Set of Ideas' is as follows:

The result of the overall framework agreement will be the establishment of a bicomunal, bizonal federal republic by two politically equal corporate bodies from which the sovereignty of the federal republic shall emanate. The two equal federated states will each freely agree to devolve a portion of their respective federal powers to the federal government. The Turkish Cypriot side declares that the essence of its position is that "The federated states are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federal state."¹

Greek Cypriots may abhor the suggestion that the projected federation will be formed by the union of two currently existing "corporate bodies", but some of them realize that the whole idea about sovereignty is that it consists in the possession of supreme and unrestricted authority to make and enforce laws, policy and administrative decisions. If the aim of the negotiating process is the establishment of a bizonal federation, then there will have to be a division of powers between the federal government and the governments of the two constituent federated states; and further, in those areas which come under the jurisdiction of the federated states, the various organs of each state will exercise due authority without interference from either the other state or the federal government. Thus, if the essence of the

¹ Mr Chris Economides pointed out in his study 'Cyprus Problem Solution Prospects' that Mr Denktash appears to have copied this formula from the first half of Article 3 of the Swiss Constitution, which reads as follows: "The Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution and as such, exercise all rights which are not entrusted to the federal power." Mr Economides's paper may be found on the internet at the following web site: <http://www.cytanet.com.cy/cyprus-problem/>.

Turkish Cypriot position were to be re-formulated in some such terms as "The federated states have unrestricted authority to make laws, policies and administrative decisions in all areas outside the jurisdiction of the federal organs, but consistent with the constitution", Greek Cypriots would have no grounds for objection, for they have already accepted a federal settlement.

It is important to note that when the 'Set of Ideas' suggested, under the heading '**Constitutional aspects of the federation**', a list of **powers to be vested in the federal government**, neither side found any cause for disagreement. The list includes all the powers which the central government in a federation would have to have, which includes not only the obvious items like foreign affairs, federal budget and taxation, and customs and the co-ordination of international trade, but also immigration and citizenship, which Greek Cypriots would not want, for obvious reasons, to be assigned to the jurisdiction of the federated states. The Turkish Cypriots, however, raised certain objections to proposals made on the **structure, composition and functioning of the federal government**, and more specifically the executive branch of government, while the Greek Cypriots asked for certain modifications. The relevant paragraphs of the 'Set of Ideas' are as follows:

36. The federal executive will consist of a federal president, a federal vice-president, and a federal council of ministers. The president and the vice-president will symbolise the unity of the country and the political equality of the communities...

38. There will be a council of ministers composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio... One of the following ministries, that is, foreign affairs, finance, or defence will be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot minister. The president and the foreign minister will not come from the same community.

40. Decisions of the council of ministers will be taken by majority vote. However, decisions of the council of ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship will require the concurrence of both the president and the vice-president.

42. The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship. The president and vice-president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for reconsideration.

With regard to paragraph 36, Greek Cypriot adopted the position that "The federal president and vice-president symbolise the unity of the country and should have a universal mandate. They must therefore be elected by federation-wide and weighted universal suffrage. Such federation-wide elections would foster intercommunal harmony. For all these reasons rotation is not acceptable option." The underlying idea seems to be that when presidential election is held, any citizen who possesses the usual qualifications, whether Greek or Turkish Cypriot, can put himself forward. Assuming that there are four times more Greek Cypriot than Turkish Cypriot voters, the vote from a Turkish Cypriot voter will count as equivalent to two or three or possibly four Greek Cypriot votes (depending on the details of the electoral law). If the person who wins the presidential election belongs to the Greek Cypriot community, a vice-president will have to be elected from among candidates belonging to the Turkish Cypriot community (or *vice versa*), and again the vote from a Turkish Cypriot voter will count as equivalent to two or more Greek Cypriot votes. The rationale of this system is that candidates for both the presidential and vice-presidential elections will have an interest and a motive to appeal not only to their own community, but to the other too. Although it is most unlikely that, under Greek Cypriot proposals, a Turkish Cypriot could become president, it is worth noting that given that Mr Vassiliou won the 1988 election by a margin of about 1.5%, and Mr Clerides won the elections of 1993 and 1998 by 0.5% and 1.5% margins respectively, Turkish Cypriot participation in these elections could have made decisive difference.

The Turkish Cypriot position on the matter of the election of the president and vice-president is as follows: (a) The president and vice-president symbolise the bicomunal nature of the federation and the political equality of the two communities. Therefore, representatives of each community should *rotate* in the presidency. (b) The rotation of representation of the federation at official occasions overseas would reflect internationally the bicomunal nature of the federation. (c) Election by common electoral roll would negate the historical rights of each community and would be contrary to the bicomunal character of the federation. Their positions in relation to paragraphs 38 and 40 of the 'Set of Ideas' are again uncompromising:

The council of ministers should be composed of an equal number of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot federal ministers to reflect the political equality of the two communities... [It] should function on the basis of consensus.

Greek Cypriots are only prepared to accept the principle of political equality if it means parity of executive and legislative power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. If the constitution were to stipulate that there should be the same number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the council of ministers, it would deny the Greek Cypriots the satisfaction that there is some acknowledgement of the fact that their community is four times larger than the Turkish Cypriot community. Whenever Turkish Cypriot leaders express the demand for the rotation of the presidency and the equal distribution of ministerial portfolios between the two sides, Greek Cypriot indignation and bitterness suggest that they believe the Turkish side is trying to walk all over them. Not only Greek nationalists, but also people of moderate views and dispositions think that if there has to be a numerical formula for the distribution of portfolios, this must be a ratio which to some extent reflects the relative size of the two communities.

Can the disagreement between the two sides on participation in the council of ministers be resolved? It is difficult to see how - but perhaps the following possibility could be explored. Maybe it can be agreed that for each of the ten ministries (let us say), there should be one minister and one deputy minister (or vice minister) who will not be a member of the council of ministers, although he will participate in various ministerial committees. Seven of the ministries should be headed by a Greek Cypriot and three by a Turkish Cypriot, as Dr Boutros Ghali suggested; but further every ministry headed by a minister belonging to one community should have a deputy minister belonging to the other community, in which case there will be seven Turkish Cypriot deputy ministers and only three Greek Cypriot. This system will give the Greek Cypriots the satisfaction that the largeness of their community is acknowledged and it is given a higher profile in the executive, while the Turkish Cypriots, with three ministers and ten deputy ministers will feel that their participation in the executive is full and effective. Perhaps a more important advantage is that all ministries will be under Greek and Turkish Cypriot political officials who will follow and control the formulation and application of policy and so no ministry will be thought of as being 'Greek' or the 'Turkish'.

One may wonder why the Turkish Cypriot side need insist on consensual decision-making in the council of ministers, given that the Greek Cypriots have conceded the proposal contained in paragraph 40 of the 'Set of Ideas'. Sir David Hannay suggested, at some point, that the executive should function on the principle of 'co-decision' by the president and vice-president. Greek Cypriots did not like it, but they might accept it, if it served to persuade

the Turkish Cypriots that the president should be Greek Cypriot and the vice-president Turkish Cypriot.

The next item on the constitutional aspects of the negotiating agenda is concerned with **fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, social and cultural rights**. The 'Set of Ideas' lays proposes that

47. All universally recognized fundamental rights and freedoms will be included in the federal constitution.

48. The freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property will be safeguarded in the federal constitution. The implementation of these rights will take into account the 1977 High Level Agreement and the guiding principles set out above.

49. The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic is established, subject only to non-discriminatory police functions

50. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented after the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been completed. The federated states will regulate these rights in a manner to be agreed upon during the transitional period consistent with the federal constitution.

Back in autumn 1992 the Greek Cypriot side accepted these proposals in principle, and added that "these rights and freedoms must be entrenched in the federal constitution and safeguarded by the federation. Their application may be regulated by the federal states, but limitations of these rights contrary to international law and human rights instruments are not acceptable." It is clear that the Greek Cypriot side wants to discourage, as far as possible, the Turkish Cypriots from imposing any arbitrary restrictions on the freedom of settlement and property ownership, by writing these rights in the federal constitution, so that any Greek Cypriots who believe their rights are being denied to them can bring action in the Federal Supreme Court. But exactly how is this course of action going to work in practice? Let us suppose that following a Cyprus settlement, a group of Greek Cypriot businessmen puts together a large amount of money to buy land in a certain area to the east of Kyrenia which has belonged to Turkish Cypriots since before 1974 with a view to building holiday homes for Greek Cypriots. Let also suppose that the owners of the land are willing to sell but the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot federated state are opposed and they introduce legislation to prohibit the sale to Greek Cypriots, citing reasons of security and public interest. If the Greek Cypriot businessmen file a suit against the Turkish Cypriot authorities to the Federal

Constitutional Court, they may lose (in which case Greek Cypriots may accuse the Court of allowing itself to be influenced by Turkish Cypriot politicians), or win (in which case, things being the way they are now, Turkish Cypriots will be angry and worried, and quite possibly willing to use other means, foul or fair, to induce the owners not to sell their land, or to harass and create difficulties for the businessmen). It may even be possible for the businessmen to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights, but whatever the outcome of the case, it may cause problems between Greek and Turkish Cypriot politicians, officials and the communities in general. For once Turkish Cypriots come to believe that the Greek Cypriots are apt to use their purchasing power to harm their economic and security interests, Greek Cypriots wanting to live and conduct business in the Turkish Cypriot federated state will be antagonised by Turkish Cypriot people and possibly threatened by them. The point of this pessimistic thought-experiment is that Greek Cypriots may argue for increased rights for their own people in the north, claiming glibly that such arrangements are "for the benefit of both communities"; but the brute fact of the matter is that if the Turkish Cypriot authorities judge that such arrangements are not in their own economic and security interests, they will prevent them one way or another. Thus the only way open to the Greek Cypriots for achieving in practice increased rights for Greek Cypriots in the north is to persuade Turkish Cypriots themselves - and not the European Court for Human Rights - that they have nothing to fear from them.

In any case, it is instructive to study the Turkish Cypriot positions in relation to the paragraphs 47-50 cited above. They are as follows:

The exercise of the freedom of movement without any restriction as soon as the federal republic is established is accepted *provided that by that stage arrangements for settling property claims will have been agreed.*² The freedom of settlement and the right of property will be regulated by the federated states in a manner to be agreed upon, consistent with the federal constitution and which preserves the bicomunal nature of the federation. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented gradually and in phases after the settlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been completed and following a moratorium for confidence-building. The federated states, in regulating these rights, will give due regard to the bicommunality and bizonality of the federation, the need to

² Italics added.

prevent intercommunal conflict, their economic interests and the preservation of communal identity...

Little reflection is needed to show that the Turkish Cypriot side is bent on securing what it calls "the settlement of property claims" or "exchange of properties and compensation", before *any* rights of Greek Cypriots are implemented in the north. Thus, for the Turkish Cypriot side the matter of the implementation of the three freedoms is linked to a solution of two interconnected issues of major importance: first, **territorial adjustments** and second, **displaced persons** (or the problem of the Greek Cypriot refugees, as the Greek Cypriots call it). The interconnectedness of the issues - which is appreciated not only by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also by foreign and UN officials who have dealings with the Cyprus problems - is brought out by considering the following points:

1. The Turkish Cypriots, who before the Turkish invasion were thought to constitute 18% of the population of the island, currently control about 34% of the land, and this is generally regarded as very unfair. Turkish Cypriot officials sometimes offer arguments why the Turkish Cypriot federated state of the projected federation should retain more territory than 18%, and there seems to be some sympathy in international circles for this point of view. Since 1984 it is assumed that the Turkish Cypriots will keep about 29% of the territory - but the difficult question is whether exactly to draw the dividing line in order to increase the area of the Greek Cypriot federated state.
2. The Turkish invasion and the subsequent division of the island caused the displacement of 160,000 Greek Cypriots and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots. All Greek Cypriot refugees were re-housed by the late 1970s, but most of those who are still alive 25 years later, as well as their heirs, demand implementation of the right of return to their homes and properties, and all Greek Cypriot politicians and ordinary people are in sympathy with them.
3. It is understood that the more territory that used to be inhabited by Greek Cypriots is to be returned to the Greek Cypriot federated state, the less difficult the problem of what is to happen to other Greek Cypriots whose homes and properties remain in the territory of the Turkish Cypriot federated state.

4. It takes no great political astuteness to appreciate that since a Cyprus settlement will have to be approved by the two communities in separate referendums, refugees and their families will be influenced in their decision of how to vote by whether the settlement will enable them to return to their homes and properties or leave them in fact displaced.

During the period leading up to the preparation of the 'Set of Ideas', Dr Boutros Ghali and his officials reflected on a number of criteria to which the Turkish Cypriot side attached particular importance - maintaining the coastline controlled by the Turkish Cypriots, respecting traditionally Turkish Cypriot areas, taking account of the distribution of water resources etc - and the Greek Cypriot view that territorial adjustments should permit the largest possible number of Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their own homes and properties, and proceeded to produce the Ghali map which marked the borderline of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot federated states. President Vassiliou accepted the map as a basis for a settlement, and although Mr Clerides at the time expressed some dissatisfaction, he is thought to find it acceptable too.

Territorial adjustments on the basis of the map would mean that the Turkish Cypriot area will be reduced from 3,355 square miles to 2,613 square miles (equivalent to 29.05% of the total territory of the Republic of Cyprus). The 742 square miles which would be given over to Greek Cypriot side constitute an area which in 1974 was inhabited by about 78,500 Greek Cypriots - about half of all refugees.³ In the quarter-of-a-century since 1974, some one-third of all Cypriots must have died, but the net increase in population is about 1% per annum. So if the Ghali map is 'implemented', about 100,000 Greek Cypriots - surviving refugees and descendants of refugees - will be able to take possession of their homes and properties. How many of these people would be *actually* willing to exercise their right of return is an interesting question which no Cyprus government or Greek Cypriot organisation has ever attempted to investigate. It is highly probable that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots from Famagusta and its suburbs (estimated to be about 30,000) would return to recreate the thriving community with its tourist and port-based economy, and so would most of the people of the north-eastern area of Morphou (about 7,500 people) and the surrounding villages (another 5-7,000). But how many people would want, given the opportunity, to return to

³ I take my figures from Mr Chris Economides's study 'Cyprus Problem Solution Prospects', to which I acknowledge my indebtedness.

Skylloura, Petra, Angastina, Afaia and other small peasant communities from which, back in the early 1970s, young men tended to leave in order to seek better-paid work and a better life-style in the towns? The best guess is that if 100,00 Greek Cypriots are given the option of returning to their homes and properties under Greek Cypriot administration, only about one-half of these would want to return, and most of these will not be young.

But what would the implementation of the Ghali map mean for the Turkish Cypriots? Mr Denktash was dismayed when Dr Boutros Ghali presented it to the two sides, arguing that it would result in 37,433 Turkish Cypriots having to leave their present homes - homes to which, in many cases, they had received 'title deeds' from the authorities of the TRNC. In fact the 'Set of Ideas' shows great sensitivity to the needs of Turkish Cypriots currently in areas which, according to the Ghali map, will come under Greek Cypriot administration; for it provides that:

74. The Turkish Cypriots who in 1974 resided in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have the option to remain in their property or request to receive a comparable residence in the area that will come under Turkish Cypriot administration. Turkish Cypriot displaced persons currently residing in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have the option to receive comparable residence in that area, to return to their former residence, or to receive a comparable residence in the area that will come under Turkish Cypriot administration.

It should be noted that if this paragraph forms part of a Cyprus settlement, it is theoretically possible that all 7,500 Greek Cypriots who have a right to live in Morphou *will* go there, and all Turkish Cypriots who currently inhabit the town (many of whom were born there) *will* move to "comparable residence in that area". But can Morphou expand by 100% to provide homes and means of livelihood for 15,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots? It may be possible to build a set of attractive housing estates for a few thousand Turkish Cypriots on the northern edge of Morphou and persuade the current Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of the town to move there *en masse* to create the municipality of *Yeni Guzelyurt* within the Turkish Cypriot federated state, thereby preserving the identity of the community, its connection with the locality, and its inclusion in the Turkish Cypriot federated state. But is it possible to expand by 100% the citrus groves, or offer alternative employment to those Turkish Cypriots who are currently growing citrus? The answer is plain: all agricultural land in and around Morphou is

owned by Greek Cypriots, who will want to claim it, if this option is open to them. Here, then, is a very difficult problem whose solution requires considerable ingenuity. It will be less difficult to solve, if it turns out that many Greek Cypriots from Morphou do not wish to live there, or if they do, they lack the skills and the interest to tend their parents' and grandparents' groves and so they are willing to sell them to the current Turkish Cypriot occupiers. In that case, it may be possible to create a physically and socially united urban centre, split into two municipalities of Morphou and Yeni Guzelyurt, each belonging to a different federated state, following the same basic idea as Lefkosia-Lefkosa and Famagusta-Magusa.⁴

An even more difficult problem is bound to arise if a large proportion of the Greek Cypriot displaced persons who in 1974 lived in what is to form the territory of the Turkish Cypriot federated state or who descended from those people (estimated to be about 100,000) and who wish to return to their homes or properties. Given (a) that the number of Turkish Cypriots who are currently in the north are estimated to be about 80,000 - about half as many have emigrated abroad - and (b) the Greek Cypriot side demands that all settlers from mainland Turkey will have to leave, it follows that if all Greek Cypriots return, they will form the majority there. Could the Greek Cypriots form the majority in both the south and the north of Cyprus? Could a situation arise in which the authorities in the Turkish Cypriot federated state find they have a larger Greek Cypriot population than a Turkish Cypriot population? No Greek Cypriot politician has ever spoken of this prospect. The common assumption among all Cypriots, as well the United Nations is that the majority of the inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot federated state will be Turkish Cypriots.⁵ However, a number of Security Council resolutions recognize the right of all displaced persons to return 'voluntarily' to their former homes and properties in conditions of safety, and both UN officials and Greek Cypriot officials and politicians are bound to support the implementation of this right. Indeed, if any Greek Cypriot politician appears to be less than fully committed to fighting for the rights of refugees, he runs the risk of being accused by the nationalists who dominate the leaderships of most parties and the media of selling his people's rights short. However, the Turkish Cypriot side - government and opposition parties - and the Turkish government are

⁴ Some elements in this proposal were suggested to me by a prominent Turkish Cypriot businessman.

⁵ The proposals which the Greek Cypriot National Council put forward in 1989 (at a time when the New Horizons party had not yet been founded) provide that the Turkish Cypriots will form a 'substantial' majority in the north.

steadfastly opposed to the return of great numbers of Greek Cypriots to the Turkish Cypriot federated state, and no major power that carries influence with Turkey has ever said that it wants to see all Greek Cypriot refugees return to their homes, much less that it intends to lean on the Turks to ensure that this happens. It would seem that when President Clerides said in his investiture address before the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives on 28 February 1998 that the solution to the Cyprus problem "is not so difficult, provided there is goodwill on all sides", he must have been thinking either that for some reason the Turkish side is suddenly going to change its position, or that the prohibition of any but a small number of Greek Cypriot refugees from returning to the Turkish Cypriot federated state is not going to render any comprehensive settlement unacceptable to the majority of Greek Cypriot people, *if other elements in the package are acceptable.*

Let us look at what the 'Set of Ideas' has to say about the refugees from what is to form the territory of the Turkish Cypriot federated state. The document proposes a system of arrangements whereby (a) the displaced persons - Greek or Turkish Cypriots - who do not want to go back to their homes and properties will have a right to obtain compensation and (b) the displaced persons who wish to return will have a right to do so. With regard to the first group the document proposes, among other things, the following:

76. Each community will establish an agency to deal with all matters related to displaced persons.

77. The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those persons seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the community in which the property is located. To this end, all titles of properties will be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the 1974 value plus inflation. Displaced persons will be compensated by the agency of their community from funds obtained from the sale of the properties transferred to the agency, or through the exchange of property...

The main idea, here, is clear enough, even though the mechanics of evaluating properties and funding the provision of compensation needs careful and detailed working out.⁶ With regard to the second group of displaced persons the 'Set of Ideas' states, among other things, that

⁶ Tens of thousands of displaced Greek Cypriot families received within the first few years after 1974 (a) Turkish Cypriot houses and land in the south abandoned by their owners, or (b) houses in refugee estates built by the Cyprus government on land belonging to the state or to Turkish Cypriots who had

84. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons who will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. If the current occupant is also a displaced person and wishes to remain, or if the property has been substantially altered or has been converted to public use, the former permanent resident will be compensated or will be provided an accommodation of similar value.

This proposal was accepted by President Vassiliou as a basis for negotiation, but - predictably - was opposed by Mr Denktash. The Turkish Cypriot side theoretically accepted the principle of the refugees' rights of return and property ownership, but in practical terms it dealt the principle the rejection of a thousand conditions. For one,

most Greek Cypriot properties on the Turkish Cypriot side have been allocated to Turkish Cypriots. These allocations created legally valid title deeds... Most of the Greek Cypriot property currently being used by the Turkish armed forces has been allocated to Vakfs [religious trusts]... Greek Cypriots who owned property in the Turkish Cypriot area will be compensated from funds obtained, *inter alia*, from the sale of Turkish Cypriot properties on the Greek Cypriot side. At current value, the Turkish Cypriot property left in the south roughly corresponds to the Greek Cypriot property left in the north.

Even more ominously, the Turkish Cypriot position states that:

The option of return will be exercised after a mutually agreed moratorium. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons who will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. A review mechanism will be established in each federated state in a mutually agreed manner to determine, upon recourse by the present owner and/or occupant, whether there are circumstances which preclude relocation in that particular case. In that event, or if the owner and/or occupant is also a displaced person or a *bona fide* purchaser or heir, or if the residence has been substantially altered; or has been converted to public use or allocated to public service institutions, Vakfs etc, or... [there follow many more conditions], the former permanent owner will be compensated.

fled to the north, or (c) state land together with a government grant to build their own houses etc. It will not be always easy to evaluate claims for loss of house and property against property received under one of the various schemes in operation.

The Greek Cypriots are vehemently opposed to what they consider as Mr Denktash's attempts to secure the legalisation of the usurpation of their homes and properties by the Turkish Cypriots. To accept that would be to yield to the law of the jungle. Like any other Greek Cypriot politician, President Vassiliou was obliged to defend the rights of his people and to demand a just solution to the issue of the refugees. The Greek Cypriot position on the matter is that "the misappropriation of Greek Cypriot properties by the Turkish Cypriot authorities is null and void". According to Dr Boutros Ghali, President Vassiliou insisted during the proximity talks that preceded the drafting of the 'Set of Ideas', on the right of return and of the right to property, "while recognizing the need to resolve practical difficulties faced by the Turkish Cypriot side. He stressed that he was opposed to any recognition of massive confiscation of the properties of displaced persons, since it would be contrary to resolutions of the United Nations and human rights instruments."⁷

The position of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot side reflect the moral beliefs, economic interests and political passions of their respective communities, and of course they are in direct conflict. Further, the Greek Cypriots demand that Turkish mainland settlers - estimated to be about 80,000 - should be sent back to return to Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots, however, make a distinction between those Turkish settlers who were given TRNC citizenship and those who came as seasonal workers with the permission of the Turkish Cypriot authorities or even without it; and they say that while seasonal workers will eventually leave, the former group have as much right to stay permanently in the north as the few hundreds of foreigners who received citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus have a right to stay in the south. There is at present no sign that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will cancel or invalidate their own laws and administrative decisions - take back the 'title deeds', expel the 'naturalised' citizens and so make the homes they occupy available for returning Greek Cypriots, or pay compensation to Greek Cypriots refugees whose homes have been given to others - so as to facilitate negotiations for a Cyprus settlement. So is the deadlock on this issue complete and irrevocable?

It seems that the deadlock *is* just that, and no compromise appears practicable, *if* any considerable number of Greek Cypriot refugees, with support from the Greek Cypriot

⁷ Paragraph 31, *Report of the UN Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus* (21 August 1992).

authorities, do actually want to exercise the right of return, and to own and enjoy the use of their property in the Turkish federated state of Cyprus. What needs to be investigated, however, is whether they do want that, and will continue to want that, when the political rhetoric which Greek Cypriot politicians and the media have so loudly produced subsides and a cooler assessment of the situation is formed.

1. It is well known that since the 1960s, if not earlier, there has been a drift of young people from the countryside, where for the most part agriculture could not support a reasonable standard of living, to the towns to seek work and better opportunities for advancement. This trend was intensified throughout the 1960s and early 1970s as a result of the development of light manufacturing industries, service industries and more particularly tourism in a number of urban centres. Once young people tasted the satisfactions of urban life and the challenges of a career and social advancement, they turned their backs on country life. Even if the Turkish invasion and the consequent displacement of the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the north did not take place, the likelihood is that the countryside in what is to become the Turkish federated state of Cyprus would not hold many attractions to keep young people in their villages; and when older people died, the village communities would gradually disappear. (If any evidence is needed for this hypothetical judgment, one need only take a look at the countryside in the Paphos district.) Kyrenia, a town of great charm and considerable potential for tourist development is a special case; and if the former Greek Cypriot inhabitants are allowed to return, many will consider this option very seriously. But with the exception of Kyrenia (whose population in 1974 was about 3,000 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots, and one-third of them must have died a quarter-of-a-century later), the villages on the Kyrenia mountain range and the plain of Mesaoria would not see many of their former Greek Cypriot inhabitants if they were given the right of return.
2. People want to live near the places of work, and a considerable proportion of Greek Cypriot families have more than one member working outside the home. Let us suppose that following a settlement, Greek Cypriot refugees are allowed to go back to their former homes, and a certain family in which the husband comes from one of the northern villages have to consider what to do. Can they find jobs for the husband, the wife, and the adult unmarried children ? Quite possibly the wife will not be coming from the same village as her husband and cannot expected to be attached to it, and the children will not have any

experience of, or liking for, the rigours of farming. The chances are that they will want to stay put - where their jobs, current home and friends are - and at most they will want to visit the old village a few times a year, probably sell any land they may have there.⁸

3. Greek Cypriots often appeal to UN resolutions concerning the rights of refugees and demand that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot authorities implement them. For example, General Assembly resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974 called *inter alia* for "the return of all refugees to their homes in safety" and resolution 3395 of 20 November 1975 called for "voluntary return of all refugees to their homes in safety". But how safe will Greek Cypriots be in Kyrenia or the villages in the north, in a hypothetical situation in which the Turkish Cypriot authorities, put under intolerable pressure by the international community and Turkey, were to allow them in? The international community has done little to bring about reconciliation and friendship between the two communities, and the two communities have done even less in this regard. In the Greek Cypriot community, the schools, the media and public figures never tire of presenting a bad image of the Turkish Cypriots and their authorities - usually personified by the image of Mr Denktash - and of course "Turkey, the ancestral enemy of Hellenism". In the Turkish Cypriot community, people are told that the Greeks want to push them to the sea, hence their ever expanding armaments programmes and military exercises. If a number among the former Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Kyrenia were to go back there following a settlement, and found a hostile Turkish Cypriot and Turkish population of 13,000 how would they feel? Will they demand that the current occupiers of their homes be turned out so that they can move in themselves. Is there a chance of this happening? And if as a result of any quarrel intercommunal incidents break out, whom are the Greek Cypriots going to seek protection from? The Turkish Cypriot police force? The Turkish Cypriot courts? UNFICYP?

4. Besides, if all Greek Cypriots who wish to go to the north and take possession of their properties were to be permitted to do so, the same should apply to Turkish Cypriots who

⁸ This illustrative example is based on a number of actual cases known to me, which appear to be typical. A number of surveys were carried out to establish whether refugees would want to return to their former homes under Turkish Cypriot authorities; the result was that between 20 and 30 per cent of those asked would *not* want to do so.

wish to go to those parts of the south: in Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos which Greek Cypriots have used for nearly a quarter of century and turned them into lucrative tourist attractions. Is it so clear that a man who has worked to his bones to make a good living out of a restaurant in the former Turkish quarter of Larnaca assigned to him by his government after 1974 would be prepared to simply give it up without a fight to a Turkish Cypriot who happened to be the son of the former owner?

All these considerations, which occasionally are rehearsed by Greek Cypriots in private, but almost never in public, lead to the conclusion that as long as relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are bad, few refugees will venture to return to the north, dominated by the Turkish Cypriot community, administered by Turkish Cypriot officials and policed by Turkish Cypriot officers. The forcible creation of mixed villages could cause violent, and even fatal incidents, in which case neither the Greek Cypriot police in the south, nor UNFICYP could afford Greek Cypriots any protection. Therefore, in the circumstances of the protracted Cyprus conflict there appears to be no better solution to the issue of displaced Greek and Turkish Cypriots than a global exchange of homes and properties between the two communities.⁹

Some time ago, the argument for a global exchange of Greek and Turkish Cypriot properties has been marshalled by Mr Chris Economides in a study which one can now find on the internet.¹⁰ Mr Economides cites the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights which states that “no one shall be deprived of his possessions”, but it adds that the state can expropriate properties “in the public interest”. The practice of expropriation with compensation at market value, in other words compulsory acquisition, is familiar in many modern states, including the Republic of Cyprus. If it is judged that it *is* in the public interest to avoid the recreation of mixed villages in the foreseeable future as such projects may cause violence and even the breakdown of public order, there is sufficient justification for effecting the expropriation of all Greek Cypriot properties in the north and of all Turkish Cypriot properties in the south, and exchanging them between the two federated states without

⁹ The concept of a long lease has no place in Cypriot financial and commercial practices. What would be the practical sense of telling a Greek Cypriot that his house in Kyrenia has not been expropriated, it is still his property, but he *must* lease it to the current Turkish occupier for 99, or even just 19 years?

¹⁰ See footnote 1, above.

compensation. The only exceptions to this radical solution would be churches, monasteries, mosques and cemeteries, which should continue to be owned and maintained by the respective religious authorities, and where religious celebrations will be freely allowed to take place.

Once the exchange of properties takes place, there will be little incentive for individual Greek and Turkish Cypriots to buy land for farming or investment in the other community's state. Mr Economides suggests that

for an interim period of 10 to 15 years, resettlement and purchase of land in the Turkish Cypriot zone by Greek Cypriots and in the Greek Cypriot zone by Turkish Cypriots should be subject to permits by the host federated authorities. Thereafter, when relations between the two communities will, hopefully, become harmonious, all restrictions should be abolished.

This seems an eminently reasonable proposal: the Greek Cypriots should accept the need to sacrifice rights which in a better world they would not; and the Turkish Cypriots should appreciate this move and be ready to make similar sacrifices to accommodate Greek Cypriots sensitivities.

The preceding discussion brings to the fore the point that Cyprus can only become a country in which all its citizens enjoy human rights and a civilised form of life if there is security for both communities and for the projected federation which is expected to embrace them both. Indeed, the security aspect of the Cyprus settlement is of vital importance in itself, and the key to everything else. Without a political settlement there are no security arrangements; and without security no political settlement is worth very much. The Greek Cypriot community has long been arguing that the best form of security is the demilitarization of the island. Turkish Cypriots are unwilling to contemplate the departure of all Turkish troops, but then President Clerides did not exactly mean that, as may be gathered from the following evidence.

Soon after President Clerides signed the 'Joint Defence Doctrine' with the then Greek Prime Minister Mr Andreas Papandreou (October 1993), he wrote to the UN Secretary-General Dr Ghali expressing Greek Cypriot security concerns:

There is no doubt that the massive presence of Turkish military forces in the occupied part of Cyprus creates serious anxieties and mistrust amongst the Greek Cypriot community regarding Turkish intentions. It also imposes on the Government of the Republic the need to increase the defensive capabilities of the country by purchasing arms. Further, it makes it necessary to request military help from Greece and to include Cyprus in the Greek defensive plans. There are also indications that the above preparations, though entirely defensive in their nature, are misinterpreted and cause anxiety and mistrust with the Turkish Cypriot community regarding Greek intentions.

President Clerides went on to propose that he disband the National Guard and hand over all Greek Cypriot armour cars, armour personnel vehicles and tanks to UNFICYP, and further that the Cyprus government undertake the total cost of "a substantially numerically increased UNFICYP" which will acquire the right of inspection in connection with security facilities, on condition that the Turkish side agrees to the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and the disbanding of the Turkish Cypriot armed forces.¹¹ And who will form the increased UNFICYP? The answer is implicit in an interview which President Clerides gave a Turkish Cypriot journalist on 1 February 1996, in which he made the following points:¹²

1. A revised Treaty of Guarantee will come into force under which Greece, Turkish, Great Britain and a number of additional countries will guarantee the security, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the federal republic.
2. An international force [i.e. "a substantially numerically increased UNFICYP] made up of contingents from the various guarantor powers (including, therefore, a Turkish contingent) will be stationed in an otherwise demilitarized Cyprus.
3. The international force will have powers (a) to ensure that no paramilitary organisations are formed and no arms are imported in Cyprus, except for arms for which there will be an agreement and which will be deemed necessary for the purposes of the police forces;

¹¹ The letter dated 17 December 1993 was published by the Cyprus government's Press and Information Office.

¹² The interview was given to Mr Suleyman Erguclu of *Kibris* newspaper. The Cyprus government's Press and Information Office published on the same a Greek translation of the interview, from which I take the main points on security.

and (b) to intervene on the basis of a decision by the guarantor powers taken by majority whenever the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus face threats either from the two communities or through the violation of the constitutional order.

4. This solution has the following advantages: (a) If there is any tension in Cyprus, this will not be exported to Greece and Turkey, which as a rule take the sides of their respective communities. (b) Great Britain will no longer be in the unenviable position of being in the middle and being accused by the two sides of not fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. (c) Any intervention will be carried out by an international force which will actually be stationed in Cyprus, thereby preventing any issues about invasion, occupation, withdrawal of forces etc which complicate matters. (b) Greek and Turkish contingents will continue to be stationed in Cyprus, but they will form part of an international force, and so any involvement or suspicion or allegation concerning chauvinist activities in their respective communities will be dealt with convincingly.

President Clerides added that "since we wish to accede to the European Union, the guarantor powers should come from the EU and other countries". He indicated elsewhere that he would agree to the Greek and Turkish contingents manned by about 1,000 troops each. The Turkish Cypriot side prefers the continuation of something like the old Treaty of Alliance, even though it wants about 5,000 troops from each of the 'Mother Countries' to be stationed. A compromise between these two positions does not seem difficult. What is more difficult is to formulate the terms under which the peacekeeping or guarantor force can take action. At present UNFICYP soldiers will only shoot in self-defence. Is President Clerides, and also troop-contributing countries, willing to contemplate a situation in which the peacekeepers use force to stop attacks by armed irregulars of one community against civilians of the other? What would take for the troops to go into action? In the mid-1980s, President Clerides, then in opposition, suggested that if there is information or an allegation about a breach of security, then the UN Security Council will send to Cyprus a fact-finding team. If the team establishes that there is such a breach, the Security Council should undertake effective measures. If, and only if, this body proves unable to agree on concrete measures to remedy the situation, the national contingent of Greece or Turkey will be able to go into action. This is not a very satisfactory arrangement, but it recognizes the fact that if there are violent incidents like those which took place in 1963-64 and 1967, Turkish troops will anyway go to protect their kith and kin, whatever the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee.

We come finally to the proposals of the 'Set of Ideas' coming under the heading of **Economic Development and Safeguards**. The reason they are considered last is that they contain a reference to the most intractable aspect of a Cyprus settlement: Cyprus's membership of the European Union. This section begins, reasonably enough, by stating that

A priority of the federal republic will be the development of a balanced economy that will benefit equally both federated states. A major programme of action will be established to correct the economic imbalance and ensure economic equilibrium between the two communities through special measures to promote the development of the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community.

The section proceeds to outline proposals for giving a boost to the Turkish Cypriot economy, and ends up by suggesting that

Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Economic Community [*sic*] will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate referendums.

The Greek Cypriot side had long expressed its willingness to offer all possible help to the Turkish Cypriots to bring their economy to the same level as theirs - if only out of enlightened self-interest. The controversy between the two sides arose out of their divergent views concerning Cyprus's EU accession. The Greek Cypriot position was stated by President Vassiliou as follows: "...The separate referendums...on matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Community should form part of, and be conducted at the same time as, the separate referendums on the overall framework agreement..." In other words, the endorsement by the two communities of a settlement package will include an endorsement of application which the government of Cyprus made in 1990 for accession to the European Community (as was then).

The Turkish Cypriot side was at the time and for many years subsequently adamant in its opposition to the federation joining Europe - of which Greece is, of course, a full member - before Turkey does the same thing. The Turkish Cypriots claimed to base their position on an article of the Cyprus Constitution of 1960, but this argument did not impress anyone but

themselves and their one-sidedly committed foreign friends. With the passage of time, the authorities of the TRNC and the Turkish government were dismayed to realize that their legalistic arguments carried no conviction with the EU countries. When President Clerides came to power in 1993, he intensified his drive for EU accession, and he persuaded by European governments, as well as the Americans, that Cyprus's EU accession would act as a catalyst for a Cyprus settlement. However, Greek Cypriot successes in Brussels only served to harden the official Turkish line, which now threatened to carry an economic and political integration of the TRNC and Turkey.

Given that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have different ideas about what would be a just settlement, and further that they both have to agree on a settlement package before Cyprus can re-form or re-invent itself as a (relatively) united, bizonal, bicomunal federation, is it possible for the two communities to achieve such a settlement which each of them will consider to be ideally just? This is no more possible than squaring the circle. The next best thing is for the two sides to abandon their arrogance and self-righteousness, recognize the limitations of their power and influence over the other community, try to understand the legitimate interests and concerns of the other community, and in the light of these factors proceed with the help of the international community to elaborate a compromise settlement. The 'Set of Ideas' represents the considered view of the international community as to what would be a fair and balanced compromise. Any such compromise can only be put to effect and sustained if the traditional ideas of Hellenism and Turkish nationalism are marginalised, and a new outlook is developed among Greek and Turkish Cypriots which respects and, indeed, cherishes cultural diversity in a common homeland. This outlook has been prevalent in Europe since the end of World War II, and has provided social-psychological support to the institution of the EU and its policies of ever-closer integration. If the Greek Cypriots accept the Turkish Cypriot desire to have their own cultural 'space' in Cyprus, and Turkish Cypriots accept the Greek Cypriot desire to place the whole of Cyprus within the wider space of the EU, then there is hope for Cyprus.