

A LETTER TO A TURKISH CYPRIOT COMPATRIOT

by Zenon Stavrinides

[Published in the Turkish Cypriot journal *Soylem* in summer 1996]

My dear Turkish Cypriot compatriot,

Can I share with you some thoughts about the state of our country? I don't know you, and I suspect that what I have heard from the Greek Cypriot media and other sources about the Turkish Cypriot community contains as many truths and insights, as inaccuracies, misconceptions and prejudices. So, it is not surprising that I have never been able to work out in the light of all the information I have got about your community what sort of faith or strength or values or intellectual resources keeps you going as a cohesive society with an organized state, despite all the pressures and deprivations many of you have experienced for nearly four decades. I feel that you and I, indeed your community and mine, should try to get to know and understand one another and if possible to become friends, because we all share at least one very important thing in common: we are have the same country. We are all Cypriots, we are all human beings born and raised in the same tiny island, and it would be natural for our ideas about who we are as historical and cultural creatures, what our rights are, where our duties lie, what we need for ourselves and wish for future generations, the freedoms we want to protect, our attitudes to our fellow human beings, work, entertainment, sex and so on, to coincide or overlap in some important respects. Such a overlap might only be limited, but it ought to be sufficient for us to meet on some common cultural and moral ground, and recognize in each other some common or similar concerns, interests, attitudes and habits, values, patterns of thinking, obsessions and prejudices, which provide a basis for developing our knowledge of each other as human beings and of each other's views about what needs to be done in Cyprus, and so lay the foundations of a friendship and co-operation on matters of importance to all of us.

However, I would be naive if I thought that our common Cypriotness works only as a possible source of friendship and co-operation. As Cypriots we share in common something else, which is also part of the very notion of what Cyprus is: the Cyprus problem. We are all, so to speak,

the people of the country of the Cyprus problem. And this problem has long been a source of disputes and conflicts between the two communities making up the people of Cyprus. Let me explain what I mean. I would characterise the Cyprus problem as a complex tangle of issues, some of which have great practical importance and some others are imaginary and come from prejudice and fear, regarding what is to be the international status of Cyprus, and if it is to be that of an independent state, what is to be its internal constitutional structure, the powers granted to its leaders and officials, and the rights and liberties of its citizens. This problem has been, directly or indirectly, the subject of, or background to, all political discussion ever since the British came to Cyprus in July 1878. I was born in 1945, and my earliest memories concerned a 'patriotic' play in my primary school in Kyrenia which was meant to convey the message that Greek Cypriots are Greeks like the people of Greece, and our national salvation from the British yoke would come about only when the island achieved union or *enosis* with Greece. My father was born in 1912, and his own earliest impressions concerned demonstrations and debates regarding the Greek-Turkish conflict and the prospects of *enosis*. My paternal grandfather - the oldest man I knew - was born in 1881, and although I have no idea what his earliest impressions were about, they must have included events connected with the demand for *enosis*, given that this demand was voiced by Greek Cypriot church and civic leaders when the first British High Commissioner Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived on the shores of Larnaca in July 1878 to take up his post, following the acquisition of Cyprus by the British government.

The general point I want to make is that *every* Cypriot who is now alive cannot remember any period in which there was no Cyprus problem and almost certainly never met and talked to any older Cypriots who could remember Cyprus without this problem. You and I, my dear compatriot, do not have anyone to tell us what it was like to live in Cyprus when the two communities were *not* preoccupied by the Cyprus problem. The development of the Cyprus problem in its various phases is an integral part of the history of Modern Cyprus, and for four generations of Cypriots, developing a conception of oneself as a political creature and learning to think politically went hand in hand with acquiring a certain scheme of ideas connected with the Cyprus problem. Now it is a well-known fact, but one that needs to be emphasized in the present context, that throughout our modern history, Greek and Turkish Cypriots took opposing views, and at various points conducted opposing propaganda, political, diplomatic and armed campaigns, in connection with the Cyprus problem. It may be

said that the views and actions taken by Greek and Turkish Cypriots about the Cyprus problem in its various phases, defined relations between the two communities. However, it is also true that the different intellectual and emotional responses which the Cyprus problem in its various phases provoked in Greek and Turkish Cypriots helped define, over time, the identities of Greeks and Turkish Cypriots as *political* communities (as contrasted to ethnic or religious communities, which are defined by reference to different criteria). In other words, dear compatriot, you and your community and I and my community are what we are as politically organised and politically conscious peoples partly as a result of the frameworks or schemes of ideas which each side has inherited from earlier generations on what the Cyprus problem is all about and how it should be resolved. The Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot frameworks of ideas were in certain respects opposed; and opposed were the national identities they created in the two communities. I remember once the Turkish Cypriot historian Salahi Sonyel told me in jest that if the Cyprus problem is ever solved, Turkish and Greek Cypriots will lose their national identities! Well, many a true word is said in jest. If the problem is solved, then the characteristic concerns of Turkish and Greek Cypriot, and the ideas and beliefs which define their values and aspirations as political communities and express their respective images of themselves will have to change. Further, those who have ambitions to lead their communities will have to learn something about public finance, public administration, trade, agriculture, health or some other areas of public life; for it is not going to be acceptable to the public that they are only good for talking expertly about the already resolved Cyprus problem and for denouncing the other side and its 'Mother Country'.

Let me follow up the theme of the previous paragraph. In the early part of the century, to be a 'true' Greek Cypriot, one had not only to possess Greek ethnic identity (under such obvious criteria as being a native Greek speaker and a Christian Orthodox), but further to see oneself as a brother or sister to mainland Greeks and to espouse the theory that Cyprus was a culturally Greek island which would remain in bonds of slavery until it was united with Greece. My grandfather was a 'true' Greek Cypriot, but given the theoretical character of his nationalist commitments he had no difficulty in forming friendships with Turkish Cypriots, including, incidentally, judge Raif Bey - the father of your President Rauf Denktaş - who was presumably a 'true' Turkish Cypriot in that his language was Turkish, he practised the Moslem faith, and he held the theory that Cyprus, far from being culturally Greek was an old Turkish province. (Here I am going to digress for a moment and be shamelessly indiscreet, and tell you

an anecdote: Mr Denktash once told me that when he was a young boy his father used to take him to my grandparents' house on the southern edge of Nicosia where my great-grandmother stuffed him with delicious - and I suspect very sugary, syrupy and thoroughly unhealthy - sweets. So now you all know how your President developed his physical grandeur!)

During the 1950s, and especially after the formation of EOKA in 1955, another criterion was added to 'true' Greekness: you had to be committed to, and preferably to participate in, the armed struggle for *enosis* struggle by EOKA; while to be a 'true' Turkish Cypriot, you now had to fulfil the additional criterion of opposing *enosis*, and from the mid-1950s to give active support Dr Kutchuk's provocatively named 'Cyprus is Turkish Party', and later the underground organisations *Volkan* and TMT, in their aim of *taksim*. During that period it was very difficult for individual Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be friends, since the corresponding communities were defined by reference to conflicting principles and practical commitments, and it was a dangerous thing for a Greek Cypriot to be thought as being 'not a true' Greek, and for a Turkish Cypriot as 'not a true' Turk. But my father at least, and no doubt many other Greek Cypriots, did maintain, despite all the difficulties, his old friendships with Turkish Cypriots, and some time ago I was delighted to meet in London one of his Turkish Cypriot colleagues who remembered him with respect and warmth. True friendship, like true love, does not bend to political pressures.

When Cyprus gained its independence in 1960 under a bicomunal constitution, the Government, House of Representatives, the civil service and police contained Greek and Turkish members who had made their reputation in their respective communities and 'won their spurs', so to speak, in the Greek or Turkish Cypriot nationalist campaign. Perhaps it was natural that these individuals brought into the life of the new republic the antagonisms and tensions of the two ethnically-based nationalisms, leading eventually to *impasses* and the collapse of the constitution. People of my generation who were growing in Cyprus in the turbulent years of 1955-59, and even more so younger people caught up in the civil strife of 1963-64, must have found it generally difficult to *begin* friendships with members of the other community. It is worth noting that the vast majority of Greek and Turkish Cypriots under the age of 50 never knew any member of the other community, and many young people I have talked to have no ideas as to it would be for Turkish and Greek Cypriots to live in the same village or neighbourhood.

However, here in Britain and probably in some other countries where there are Greek and Turkish Cypriot immigrants and students, it is possible for members of the two communities and meet and be friends. In Britain, for example, there is the Cypriot Community Centre of London frequented by members of the two communities, the Forum of Co-operation Between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots which brings together members of the two communities who believe in intercommunal reconciliation and the restoration of the unity of Cyprus under a federal settlement. There is, also, the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs of which I am Secretary, which organises regular seminars and conferences on the history, politics, and social and economic developments in the two Cypriot communities, as well as Greece and Turkey. Through this Association many people from the three countries come together to obtain objective information and expert views about the three countries, and in many cases friendships have been forged between these people. Speaking personally, I am happy and proud to have formed friendships and sincere intellectual contacts with a number of Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks, mainland Greeks, as well as other Greek Cypriots.

Inevitably, people like me and my colleagues in our Association receive occasionally offensive remarks, threats and nasty messages (sometimes through the Internet!) from a number of bigoted Greek Cypriots. For example, some time ago while in Nicosia I saw in a public place a respected Greek Cypriot lawyer whom I had known in the past; and as I walked towards him to greet him he shouted out in a tone of voice expressing indignation and contempt, "Here comes a Greek-speaking Turk!" which of course was intended as a sharp rebuke for my views and activities. This silly remark, coming as it does from an influential and by no means untypical member of the Greek Cypriot establishment, is from one point of view deeply disheartening: for it seems that being unfriendly and hostile to Turkish Cypriots has come to be considered by a sizeable number of Greek Cypriots - what I call the Hellenic fundamentalists - as part of the definition of what it is to be 'true' Greek Cypriot.

Even a thoroughly decent and honourable politician like President Glafkos Clerides, who I am sure understands the need to develop reconciliation and trust between the two communities as a condition for a workable political settlement, must be finding it politically difficult to adopt policies conducive to this objective, given that there are influential Hellenic fundamentalist elements in the Democratic Rally party (DESY) and the Democratic Party (DEKO) which are

supporting his government in parliament. I recall that when the UN Secretary-General Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed in New York in May 1993 a set of Confidence Building Measures, President Clerides accepted them immediately in the hope that they would also be accepted by Denktash and serve as a prelude to early progress in negotiations with him on the substance of the Cyprus problem. The negotiations went into recess when President Denktash requested a break to consult the Turkish Cypriot Assembly and people about the CBMs. When Clerides returned to Cyprus he discovered that there was widespread opposition to the package among politicians and the media. Even DESY, the party he himself founded in 1976 would not give him full and unreserved support. Thus when Denktash started attacking the CBMs in Ankara and North Cyprus and demanded further advantages and concessions, Clerides found the opportunity to get out of his commitments. The lesson is that Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalists would rather sacrifice their own advantages, if that means denying the other side the chance to relieve the pressures it faces and improve its situation.

It is a misfortune for Cyprus that a degree of bigotry and fanaticism has long permeated political culture and thought in both Cypriot communities, and this has contributed to the creation of the sense that the Cyprus problem cannot be solved through negotiations by the two sides. The political scene in both communities has been dominated by two main groups: moderate nationalists and extreme nationalists. Both groups exalt the greatness, political ideals, military virtues, and cultural superiority of their own nation and champion its claim on Cyprus. However, while the moderate nationalists are willing to minimize and adjust the political aims they would ideally want to achieve for their community by considerations of how far they could realistically hope to impose these aims on the other community, extreme nationalists pursue their aims in their maximal and unadulterated form without any thought for the extent to which the limits of their power and the influence of their allies could affect the realizability of their aims. If in 1975 President Makarios and most of the other Greek Cypriot politicians adopted the aim of a multi-cantonal system under a strong Greek-dominated government, and in 1977 they replaced it by the aim of a bizonal federation, it was not because they *respected* the Turkish Cypriot point of view, but because they were persuaded by the American and other Western governments that they could not hope to go back to the pre-1974 political arrangements and population pattern, but they would be helped to get a bicomunal bizonal federation in which considerable territory would be returned to Greek Cypriots and a considerable number of Greek Cypriot refugees would be permitted to go to the north.

After so many years since the division of the island, the idea of a bizonal federation upsets many Greek Cypriots, and extreme nationalists like Archbishop Chrysostomos probably do not accept it. It is worth mentioning that in the Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections of 26 May 1996, the extreme nationalist New Horizons party which denounced bizonal federation and called for a campaign to replace this aim with that of a unitary state only received 1.7% of the votes and failed to get into the House of Representatives. But Mr Nicos Rolandis's Liberal Party and Mr Michalis Papapetrou's ADISOK party - the two parties which put high premium on the development of reconciliation and friendship between the two communities as a necessary condition for a workable political settlement - also failed to get in. It is a consolation that there is a significant section in the biggest party, the Democratic Rally, who recognize the desirability of intercommunal reconciliation and that the second party, AKEL, is also committed to this aim - but the two parties are unlikely to agree to continuing presence of Turkish troops to protect the Turkish Cypriot community or to Turkey maintaining its right of unilateral action to guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. Now, dear compatriot, if I am not mistaken, the Turkish Cypriot community has its own versions of politicians Clerides, Chrysostomos and Papapetrou; and your electorate has not been very supportive of your own Papapetrou. I don't think I need elaborate this point, because you obviously understand the political culture of your own community much better than I. Perhaps we can agree that in both our communities, politicians who are not at least moderate nationalists command little support from the electorate

Have you ever asked yourself, dear compatriot, why the Cyprus problem has remained unsolved, despite the continuing distress, economic damage, and injustice it has caused most Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and despite the efforts of mediators, foreign governments, the UN Security Council and successive UN Secretaries-General and his advisers to help find a compromise settlement? No doubt your leaders, your mass media and other opinion-makers have told you that a solution has proved impossible because the Greek Cypriots are intransigent and demand to colonize the north, and to bring about the departure of Turkish troops and other conditions which, if accepted will put in jeopardy Turkish Cypriot security and freedom from Greek Cypriot pressures. Greek Cypriot leaders tell our people that the solution has proved impossible because the Turkish side is intransigent and unwilling to agree to the departure of Turkish occupation troops which pose a mortal danger to us and to the

implementation of universally respected human rights, like the rights to freedom of movement, to settlement and to property ownership. They also tell us that Turkey wants to take over the whole of Cyprus and place it permanently under its control. Turkish and Greek Cypriots share in common the tendency to blame everyone except themselves for all their calamities and misfortunes. But still, I want to ask you and every other Cypriot to consider for themselves and independently of what they read and hear in the media why the Cyprus problem is still unsolved, 32 long years after the bicomunal constitutional order of 1960 broke down, and especially since 1974. I think the causes are very complex, but I should like to identify and set out three factors which seem to me to be particular central to the issue.

(1) The first factor I will mention is already obvious. After a generation of disputes and conflicts between the two communities, fuelled by nationalist education, official and unofficial propaganda and verbal nastiness built into the political vocabulary, the killings, injuries, distress and refugee waves caused by the events of 1963-64, 1967 and 1974, there are many Greek Cypriots and many Turkish Cypriots who dislike other community intensely, so much so that they do not want a settlement which is going to give the other community any advantages. Intercommunal mistrust and dislike is widespread, but here are substantial groups in both communities who still want to see integration of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, or even good neighbourliness and co-operation between the two states of the federation.

(2) With the passage of time, especially after 1974, important economic and professional interests have grown in both communities which depend for their interests, career prospects, privileges and economic advantages on the division of the island into two mono-ethnic states. I was told by Turkish Cypriot businessmen - and this is a well-known and unsurprising fact - that a number of Turkish Cypriot businessmen are able to import foreign goods and sell them in the local market or export them to Turkey only because they do not have to compete with much larger Greek Cypriot import companies which can afford to sell at lower prices. Again, Turkish Cypriot manufacturers have set up and operate factories with low-paid Turkish Cypriot workers; and if a federation is to be set up, these workers will most likely be attracted to Greek Cypriot factory owners who can pay better wages. Now, even this reasoning were sound, Turkish Cypriot businessmen should not be putting their own selfish interests above those of their community as a whole. Believe me, dear compatriot, almost all Greek Cypriots are willing to seek ways to support Turkish Cypriot businessmen in every way possible, because they well

understand that it is in their interest too to ensure prosperity for the Turkish Cypriot community - providing, that is, that a federation is established which is sufficiently united and Greeks are able to travel to, see and feel the north as part of their country. In case you think that Greek Cypriot businessmen are necessarily of a higher moral calibre, I can tell you that a few years ago I was told by a Greek Cypriot politician - speaking in private and I suspect under the influence of brandy - that property developers in the south do not want Varosha to be returned to its rightful owners, as that would bring down property and land values in Limassol and Paphos. Further, if a Federal Republic is established in Cyprus, a number of Ministries of the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC, for example the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, will have to merge, and probably a proportion of officials may be asked to take early retirement or told that they will not be able to reach the top echelons of the service because now there are officials from the other community who had to be integrated and given promotion. I dread to think what officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the corresponding Turkish Cypriot body will be thinking about their post-federation future in a demilitarized Cyprus.

(3) The two sides have been seeking different things in the direct or proximity negotiations held since 1975 for a new political settlement. Each community perceives the other as an adversary, and it wants to obtain rights, liberties, privileges, territory, wealth, security arrangements, and policy-making and legislative powers to which it is convinced it has a right, and for the denial of this claim it blames the other side. To put the matter briefly and with inevitable crudeness, the great majority of Greek Cypriots want to redress the humiliation of 1974 by restoring the unity of the island they regard as their country - and of course (they would hasten to add) the country of the Turkish Cypriots as well. So, if a bizonal federation is to be set up, this should ensure (a) the departure of Turkish troops which pose a mortal danger for Greek Cypriots, (b) respect for the rights to free movement, settlement and property ownership of all citizens - and more especially of refugees - and (c) Greek Cypriot leaders and officials should have, if possible, more constitutional powers than the Turkish Cypriot leaders in federal matters, such as foreign policy, and more especially the conditions and consequences of Cyprus's membership in the European Union. On the other hand, as I understand the matter, Turkish Cypriots want the territory of North Cyprus as their own 'country', to inhabit and control themselves to the exclusion of Greek Cypriots, and they want this state of affairs recognized by the UN and supported by international organisations. Once the principle of bizonality is accepted by the Greek side, then a bicomunal, bizonal

federation could be formed in which the two communities will enjoy political equality and security guarantees from their respective 'Mother Countries'. So, even when well-meaning third parties try to help the two sides to the Cyprus problem to seek a negotiated settlement by producing frameworks of suggestions, the various elements of which reflect the concerns, needs and views of one or other of the parties - like Dr Boutros-Ghali's - 'Set of Ideas' of 1992 - these turn out to be unacceptable to one or other or both communities, or at least their leaders. (I recently heard a Greek Cypriot diplomat expressing the view that "both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides must be hoping that a compromise settlement will be *imposed* by force by the UN Security Council, so that they will not have to place their signatures on an agreement which they would not be able to sell Greek and Turkish nationalists, that is, people for whom any suggestion of a compromise is considered treasonable or a sell-out.")

Since no settlement is in sight, the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC try to exert pressure and create problems for each other's community by denying them their rights and opportunities for a better life. For example, the TRNC, and the Turkish Army on which it is dependent for its defence, will not permit any Greek Cypriots, not even the refugees, to go to the Turkish-controlled north, and they are keeping Varosha as a ghost town, even though it could receive back probably 30,000 of its rightful inhabitants to their empty and derelict houses. Do you sometimes wonder, dear compatriot, whether this heartless Turkish Cypriot policy is necessary? Does it express, for example, your values and those of your family and friends? I know, of course, that your leaders and mass media have told you that you have suffered for too long from Greek Cypriot actions, and you cannot allow them to colonize the north and drive you to the sea! These excuses strike us all in the south as absurd, but then we are never critical of the policies and actions of our government against your community, For example, we Greek Cypriots have put an embargo on your community which, although not very effective, has hampered your economic and social development - no doubt this is part of the explanation of the emigration of so many Turkish Cypriots - and has restricted your ability to receive tourists, to seek advice and financial assistance from foreign governments and international organisations, and to present yourselves to the outside world as a civilised and talented people. Wouldn't it make good sense for each community to give the other some of the things it needs to improve its security and welfare?

I ask you dear compatriot: Why are we so uncivilised and nasty to each other, and why do we permit the government in each of our communities to harm each other's interests and deny each other's rights? Why so much bloody-mindedness and cruelty? Why such total unwillingness on the part of each of the sides to acknowledge the other's needs, concerns and points of view? But of course this is not all. Each side engages in a ceaseless propaganda war against the other, which intensifies the fear, mistrust and insecurity of members of both communities. I have read the Greek Cypriot press regularly since my adolescence and I can assure you I have never seen any sincere sympathy ever being expressed for the needs of the Turkish Cypriot community, or any respect for its achievements, or indeed any favourable comments for its leaders (unless, perhaps, they were opposition leaders criticising Denktash). So anything that the Turkish Cypriot leaders demand of the Greek Cypriots on behalf of their community is almost automatically interpreted by the Greek Cypriot leaders and opinion-makers as unjust, audacious, preposterous. No doubt Turkish Cypriots react in the same way to anything demanded by Greek Cypriot leaders. The very natural demand of Greek Cypriots to be able to move and settle freely in any part of the country they wish to and under conditions of safety is immediately construed by your community as something evil which poses a threat to your security and welfare.

I am not going to suggest that if all Greek Cypriot refugees were to return to the North, that would have no serious social, economic and security implications for the Turkish Cypriot community. I understand well the Turkish Cypriot need to have their own physical and social 'space' in which to develop their culture free from the kinds of fears and pressures which they experienced in the years 1963-74, when they were living in a number of enclaves surrounded by Greek Cypriot security forces. This need, however, must be balanced against the right in principle of all Greek Cypriots to enjoy the privileges of free movement and (within reasonable limits) settlement and property ownership in the northern part of their own country. How the two needs can be accommodated is something that requires careful study based on objective information. How many of those Greek Cypriots who fled their homes in July-August 1974 are still alive? I don't think anyone knows, but since Cypriots live for an average of 72 or 73 years, only about two-thirds of the original 180,000 refugees would be alive now. Of these, some thousands came from the beautiful town of Kyrenia, but most of them came from much less attractive villages; poor and shabby villages to which they are unlikely to want to return from their present modern and comfortable dwellings in the south, where they or

their grown-up children have good jobs. Perhaps, once proper research is carried out into the nature and size of the refugee problem and the relevant facts are established, it may turn out that only a small proportion of the refugees wish to go to live in their old homes in the north - which is what both former President Vassiliou and current President Clerides believe - in which case Turkish Cypriots will not be deprived of either their characteristically Turkish Cypriot cultural environment or their security. I am sure that many other practical issues apparently dividing the two sides to the Cyprus problem can be solved in a satisfactory way, if the sides approach these issues in a climate of mutual trust and good will, in good faith and with a sincere desire to find reasonable solutions which take account of the needs, rights and concerns of both communities. But is there a climate of mutual trust and good will in Cyprus? The answer is obvious.

In April 1993, shortly before the start of the ill-fated negotiations held in New York between Clerides and Denktash under the chairmanship of Boutros-Ghali, I had the pleasure and honour of giving a lecture at the East Mediterranean University in Famagusta in which, among other things, I drew attention to the division of Cyprus into a north and a south part separated by two lines of confrontation: a line of military confrontation formed by two hostile armies facing one another, and a line of intellectual confrontation formed by two conflicting sets of ideas, institutions and political cultures. I went on to observe:

This sort of situation, with all it implies, is of course infinitely less terrible than the intercommunal conflict or civil war which Cyprus experienced in 1963-64 and during the Turkish intervention of 1974. But the present situation is not one of peace - there is no friendship, no co-operation, no communication, only institutionalized hostility. It is, in fact, a kind of war of propaganda and psychological attrition, or perhaps a kind of Cold Civil War, rather similar in its general character to the Cold War between America with its European allies and the Soviet Union with the other communist states which divided the Western World from the East from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. Now, it is sometimes said that nobody wins a war, since even the side whose forces destroy or subjugate the other, incurs itself terrible losses in terms of dead and wounded, physical destruction of its material culture and brutalisation of its people. I should like to extend this idea by observing that nobody really wins a Cold War or a Cold Civil War. When two countries or communities or sides conduct a propaganda

or psychological, both sides give free reign to brutal, intolerant, irrational, uncaring and chauvinistic elements within their own societies which at the end debase the quality of the life of their own peoples. When one side lies about the other side, their own people eventually become confused about the distinction between truths and lies and find it increasingly difficult to form realistic judgments about society and politics. When a side hurts its opponents, it eventually erodes the humanity of its own people and they start hurting each other. When one side heaps dirt and humiliation the other, their own people dirty their hands and faces with the dung of nastiness, and they become nasty among themselves. When one side threatens and scares the other side, they themselves become intellectually affected by the twin evils of hatred and violence, and before long they debase any noble ideals they may once have had, thereby destroying the values underpinning the inner cohesion of their own culture.

What I dared not say during my lecture was that I did not see how Clerides and Denktash could reach a compromise settlement in May 1993 - the kind of honourable and reasonable compromise which Dr Boutros-Ghali did so much to promote - and then sell it to their communities, given the long years of Cold Civil War waged with varying degrees of success by the two governments and the climate of hostility, mistrust and the other public attitudes generated by the Cold Civil War, to say nothing about the powerful economic and professional interests entrenched in the separatist situation.

As you may recall, dear compatriot, that round of negotiations did not lead to the greatly needed breakthrough. I believe Clerides was sorely disappointed at Denktash's tactics, as that ended his hopes that he could soon enter into an agreement with his old friend and opposite number in the 1968-76 negotiations for a reasonable and balanced package deal, a package which would involve mutual concessions and include confirmation for Cyprus's application to join the European Union. But of course, another effort has to be made to break the *impasse*, and sooner or later Denktash and Clerides would have to meet. In fact, in early June 1996 there were indications that the UN Secretary-General will soon call for a resumption of direct talks between the two leaders - but are the prospects of success any better? It seems to me clear that the political and psychological climate in Cyprus is no more favourable for mutual concessions now than it was in 1993, and probably it is worse, especially in view of the failure of the original CBE project, the increased tension between Greece and Turkey, the increased

nationalist feeling in the Greek Cypriot community partly caused by the irresponsible nationalist talk of some of Clerides's supporters, and the revival of Islamic values in Turkey which seems to touch certain sections of Turkish Cypriot public opinion. Is Clerides going to ask Denktash to agree on the principles of a Cyprus Federation, even though he is aware (indeed, he told me so some years ago, and presumably he told other Greek Cypriots) that Denktash, while he sometimes speaks of a federation, he actually seeks a *confederation*? And anyway, would a federation work in the circumstances? What do you think dear compatriot?

Here I would like to bring in certain views which the Greek Cypriot sociologist Kyriacos Markides, professor at the University of Maine in the United States, expressed in a paper delivered in November 1991 at the Onassis Center for Hellenic Studies at New York University. At some point he says this:

The most basic question one must ask in dealing with the Cyprus problem is whether federation will have the ingredients of a lasting solution or whether it will be a prelude to further conflict and bloodshed. To begin to answer that question we must take into account the social situation now prevailing in Cyprus. A legal set-up like federation can be sustained only when it is compatible with the underlying political culture and social organization. Otherwise it will be rejected in an analogous way that a body rejects an incompatible heart transplant. At the moment there is such deep mistrust and feeling of insecurity on both sides that federation is highly problematic as an option. Only when the state of mistrust and insecurity is removed from within the social consciousness of Greek and Turkish Cypriots will federation have a chance of providing a framework for a peaceful, sustainable future.

Markides goes on to say - very reasonably, it seems to me - that "for federation to work in any society requires that the various groups that compose that society must have something in common that could bind them together. The groups that exercise power in the society must have common historical experiences that could be a source of identity, pride, a sense of patriotism that would be equally shared by the various groups and regions of the country." Our author links this point to the insight of the great French sociologist Emile Durkheim that a group of people must form a society with a shared a moral order and a sentiment of solidarity

before any legal arrangements are set up, such as a civil government or a modern bureaucratic state. Markides concludes:

...The current exclusively legalistic approach in solving the Cyprus problem suffers from the weaknesses first identified by Durkheim. Two hostile societies cannot be expected to come together and set up a federation and expect that to work. They will cheat on the contract since neither side would trust the other would honour the contract, as in fact happened in Cyprus in 1960.

In fact I did ask a few Greek Cypriot friends if they believed that in the event of a federal settlement in Cyprus they would be sure the Turkish Cypriots would hand over all their weapons to UNFICYP, and most said no. Perhaps, dear compatriot, you can ask your friends whether they could trust the Greek Cypriots to hand over all their weapons. And if the two sides cannot trust each other on such a fundamental matter as their safety and security, will they not feel justified in storing up themselves arms and ammunition, just in case the other side attacks? And if there are Greek Cypriot suspicions that there are weapons in the Mufti's residence or Turkish Cypriot allegations that there are weapons in the Archbishop's Palace, and these two supreme clerics deny everything, who is going to dare search their basements? Has UNFICYP ever done that sort of thing before?

Is the thrust of my remarks intended to show that the Cyprus problem can never be solved, and that hostility and mistrust which Turkish and Greek Cypriots feel for each other constitute a permanent and immutable fixture of their respective group minds and group personalities? My answer to this question is an emphatic HAYIR and OCHI! Turkish and Greek Cypriot, under honourable, wise and sensitive leaders *can* indeed come together and over a period of time learn, to understand each other and work together to develop life in Cyprus in ways which reflect their common values and aspirations; or alternatively they can continue indefinitely in a state of Cold War and in constant tension and rage, as has happened to Turkey and Greece for several decades. A future in peace, friendship and co-operation, or alternatively a protracted Cold War which destroys the souls and cultures of the two communities, are both within the grasp of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. If they want Cold War, they only need to continue doing what they have been doing in the last forty years. If they want peace - real peace, not the kind of cease-fire with institutionalized injustice that prevails

since 1974 - then they must begin by changing many of their ideas, policies, values, habits of thought and every other aspect of life in which their orientations clash. In other words - to use reluctantly a phrase that has got associated with some of the terrible practices of communist regimes - both communities must *re-educate* themselves into the ways of thinking, the habits of mind, the forms of knowledge and understanding, and the ideals of tolerance, respect and concern for the other community's point of view which constitute necessary conditions for peaceful co-existence. But what does this mean in practice? The subject is too large and complicated to be discussed here, and anyway I will readily admit I don't know the whole of the answer. But part of the answer is suggested by the opening words of the Preamble to the Charter of UNESCO: "As war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be built." In an analogous way we should say: "As the Cold Civil War, whose brutality, intolerance, irrationality, callousness and chauvinism has bedevilled social life and culture in our common country Cyprus began in the minds of us Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it is therefore in our minds that the structures of peace, reason, care, decency, intercommunal understanding and friendship, and social solidarity should be built."

Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it seems to me, must first learn to be good neighbours, before they can learn to be good partners. They should allow free access of members of the other community in their own communal space, and afford them every hospitality and protection, as they afford tourists coming from distant parts of the world. Further, they should learn to love and respect themselves for being *Cypriots* (the one thing that is common to both communities), rather than for being Greek or Turkish Cypriots (two concepts which are unfortunately loaded with potentially conflicting political meaning). During a period of re-education and social therapy, the two communities should try to cast off ideas and habits which in the past have set them apart and they should start co-operating on practical matters of common concern and interest, starting with unpolitical or non-ideological but important matters like water conservation, environmental protection, co-operation between the two health services, police forces etc. The bitter pill I think Greek Cypriots will have to swallow is that this practical co-operation will be conducted between two communities equal in dignity, rights and powers. The bitter pill which Turkish Cypriots will have to swallow is that they will not be accorded recognition as a separate sovereign state by the international community. However, this practical co-operation will soon have to be institutionalized when the two communities set up institutions and organs and agree to accord to them appropriate powers to

manage various aspects of foreign affairs, currency, international trade etc. These institutions and organs will form the core machinery of the bizonal, bicomunal 'Federal Republic of Cyprus', which will replace the Republic of Cyprus in the United Nations and other international organisations. However, this will not mean that the relation between the northern state and the southern state will necessarily become like the constituent states of an orthodox federation, as for example the United States of America. Their relation initially will be a relation of co-operation between two autonomous political entities. The Federation can progressively develop stronger central institutions as and when the people in the two states feel and see themselves to be as deeply Cypriot (to the exclusion of their ethnic identity), as the people of the 50 states of the USA feel themselves to be deeply American.

As for security arrangements, I hope Turkish Cypriots will accept President Clerides's eminently reasonable proposal that an international force which includes Greek and Turkish troops should replace 'independent' troops from Turkey and Greece and take charge of the security situation - but I think their mandate from the UN Security Council should accord them powers to open fire against any armed group from any community which cross the internationally recognized border between the federated states in order to carry out crimes against peaceful citizens, no matter what the excuse is. Is President Clerides willing to see any armed Greek Cypriots on the way to 'liberating' Kyrenia to be shot at with impunity by an international force? Is President Denktash willing to agree that any Turkish Cypriot armed group going to the south to avenge the deaths of Turkish Cypriots in Zygi in the summer of 1974. Maybe we shall soon know; and we may know what Greek and Turkish nationalists are going to say about the new security regime.

But ultimately, the best security is the elimination of enmity and the development of trust and friendship. When was Europe more secure and safe: ten years ago when there was a balance of terror between the Western and Eastern alliances, or in the last few years, when the United States and the countries of Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern Europe have developed a system of unprecedented agreements in the fields of arms control, finance and investment, contacts between peoples, and educational and cultural exchanges? What makes two peoples more unwilling to wage war against each other: is it fear of dying from the other's bullets and bombs, or respect and friendship for the other people which entails refusal to deny them the right to live in safety and freedom and to enjoy the other rights recognized in all civilised

countries? These are the things we have to consider when we discuss our security arrangements, my dear unknown Turkish Cypriot compatriot.

Yours in friendship

Zenon Stavrinides