Comrades!
In the party central committee's report at the 20th Congress and in a
number of speeches by delegates to the congress, as also formerly during
plenary CC/CPSU [central committee of the Communist party of the Soviet
Union] sessions, quite a lot has been said about
the cult of the individual
and about its harmful consequences.
After Stalin's death, the
central committee began to implement a policy of explaining concisely
and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of
Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman
possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a
man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone,
can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour.
Such a belief about a man,
and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years.
The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of
Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely
sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been
written in his lifetime. Stalin's role of Stalin in the preparation and
execution of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, and in the
fight for the construction of socialism in our country, is universally
known. Everyone knows it well.
At present, we are
concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now
and for the future - with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been
gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the
source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of
party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.
Because not all as yet
realise fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the
individual, the great harm caused by violation of the principle of
collective party direction and by the accumulation of immense and
limitless power in the hands of one person, the central committee
considers it absolutely necessary to make material pertaining to this
matter available to the 20th congress of the communist party of the
Soviet Union.
Allow me first of all to
remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every
manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German
political worker Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any
cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the
[1st] international the numerous addresses from various countries which
recognised my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them,
except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the
secret society of communists on the condition that everything making for
superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute.
Lassalle subsequently did quite the opposite."
Sometime later Engels
wrote: "Both Marx and I have always been against any public
manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases
when it had an important purpose. We most strongly opposed such
manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally."
The great modesty of the
genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin always
stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing
and organisational roles of the party as a living and creative organism,
and also the role of the central committee.
Marxism does not negate the
role of the leaders of the working class in directing the revolutionary
liberation movement. While ascribing great importance to the role of the
leaders and organisers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly
stigmatised every manifestation of the cult of the individual,
inexorably combated [any] foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a
"crowd," and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and
to the people.
Lenin taught that the
party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on
the fact that behind the party follows the people - workers, peasants,
and the intelligentsia. Lenin said: "Only he who believes in the people,
who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the
people, will win and retain power."
Lenin spoke with pride
about the Bolshevik Communist party as the leader and teacher of the
people. He called for the presentation of all the most important
questions before the opinion of knowledgeable workers, before the
opinion of their party. He said: "We believe in it, we see in it the
wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch."
Lenin resolutely stood
against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing
role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state. He worked out
Bolshevik principles of party direction and norms of party life,
stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its
collegiality. Already during the pre-Revolutionary years, Lenin called
the central committee a collective of leaders and the guardian and
interpreter of party principles. "During the period between congresses,"
Lenin pointed out, "the central committee guards and interprets the
principles of the party."
Underlining the role of the
central committee and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our
central committee constituted itself as a closely centralised and highly
authoritative group." During Lenin's life the central committee was a
real expression of collective leadership: of the party and of the
nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in
matters of principle, Lenin never imposed his views upon his co-workers
by force. He tried to convince. He patiently explained his opinions to
others. Lenin always diligently saw to it that the norms of party life
were realised, that party statutes were enforced, that party congresses
and plenary sessions of the central committee took place at their proper
intervals.
In addition to VI Lenin's
great accomplishments for the victory of the working class and of the
working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application
of the ideas of scientific communism to life, his acute mind expressed
itself also in this. [Lenin] detected in Stalin in time those negative
characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the
future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, VI Lenin made a
completely correct characterisation of Stalin. He pointed out that it
was necessary to consider transferring Stalin from the position of
general secretary because Stalin was excessively rude, did not have a
proper attitude toward his comrades, and was capricious and abused his
power.
In December 1922, in a
letter to the party congress, Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "After taking over
the position of general secretary, comrade Stalin accumulated
immeasurable power in his hands and I am not certain whether he will be
always able to use this power with the required care."
This letter - a political
document of tremendous importance, known in the party's history as
Lenin's "Testament" - was distributed among delegates to this 20th Party
Congress. You have read it and will undoubtedly read it again more than
once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is
given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the party, the people, the
state, and the future direction of party policy.
Vladimir Ilyich said:
"Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely
tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a
defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of general
secretary. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the
method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which
another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ
from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater
loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward the
comrades, a less capricious temper, etc."
This document of Lenin's
was made known to the delegates at the 13th party congress, who
discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the position of
general secretary. The delegates declared themselves in favor of
retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed Vladimir
Ilyich's critical remarks and would be able to overcome the defects
which caused Lenin serious anxiety.
Comrades! The party
congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm
Stalin's character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his
"Testament". These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna
Krupskaya to [Lev] Kamenev, who was at that time head of the politburo,
and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.
I will now read these
documents:
Lev Borisovich
Because of a short letter
which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by
permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusually
rude outburst directed at me.
This is not my first day in
the party. During all these 30 years I have never heard one word of
rudeness from any comrade. The party's and Ilyich's business is no less
dear to me than to Stalin. I need maximum self-control right now. What
one can and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich I know better than any
doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and what does not. In any
case I know [it] better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory
[Zinoviev] as much closer comrades of V[ladimir] I[lyich]. I beg you to
protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile
invectives and threats. I have no doubt what the control commission's
unanimous decision [in this matter], with which Stalin sees fit to
threaten me, will be. However I have neither strength nor time to waste
on this foolish quarrel. And I am a human being and my nerves are
strained to the utmost."
N. Krupskaya
Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on December 23, 1922. After
two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin
the following letter:
To comrade Stalin (copies for: Kamenev and Zinoviev):
Dear comrade Stalin!
You permitted yourself a
rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her.
Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was
said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have
no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me. I
need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which
is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh
carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and
apologising, or whether you prefer the severance of relations between
us.
Sincerely: Lenin, March 5, 1923
(Commotion in the hall.)
Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently
for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin's
life, could thus behave toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya - whom
the party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as
an active fighter for the cause of the party since its creation - we can
easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative
characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years
acquired an absolutely insufferable character.
As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified. In the first
period after Lenin's death, Stalin still paid attention to his advice,
but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir
Ilyich. When we analyse the practice of Stalin in regard to the
direction of the party and of the country, when we pause to consider
everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's
fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in
Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the
last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold
harm to our party.
We have to consider seriously and analyse correctly this matter in order
that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form
whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely
did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work, and who
practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him,
but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic
character, contrary to his concepts.
Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation
with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute
submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed these concepts or tried to
prove his [own] viewpoint and the correctness of his [own] position was
doomed to removal from the leadership collective and to subsequent moral
and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period
following the 17th party congress, when many prominent party leaders and
rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of
communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.
We must affirm that the party fought a serious fight against the
Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed
ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was
carried on successfully, as a result of which the party became
strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role.
The party led a great political-ideological struggle against those in
its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a
political line hostile to the party and to the cause of socialism. This
was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the
political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the
Bukharinites led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and
toward capitulation to the world bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a
moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of
right deviation had prevailed among us, or orientation toward
"cotton-dress industrialisation," or toward the kulak, etc. We would not
now have a powerful heavy industry; we would not have the kolkhozes; we
would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement.
It was for this reason that the party led an inexorable ideological
fight, explaining to all [its] members and to the non-party masses the
harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite
opposition and the rightist opportunists. And this great work of
explaining the party line bore fruit. Both the Trotskyites and the
rightist opportunists were politically isolated. An overwhelming party
majority supported the Leninist line, and the party was able to awaken
and organise the working masses to apply the Leninist line and to build
socialism.
A fact worth noting is that extreme repressive measures were not used
against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites, and others
during the course of the furious ideological fight against them. The
fight [in the 1920s] was on ideological grounds. But some years later,
when socialism in our country was fundamentally constructed, when the
exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when Soviet social
structure had radically changed, when the social basis for political
movements and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted, when
the ideological opponents of the party were long since defeated
politically - then repression directed against them began. It was
precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass
repression through the government apparatus was born, first against the
enemies of Leninism - Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long
since politically defeated by the party - and subsequently also against
many honest communists, against those party cadres who had borne the
heavy load of the civil war and the first and most difficult years of
industrialisation and collectivisation, who had fought actively against
the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist party line.
Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term
automatically made it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man
or men engaged in a controversy be proven. It made possible the use of
the cruelest repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality,
against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who
were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad
reputations. The concept "enemy of the people" actually eliminated the
possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's
views known on this or that issue, even [issues] of a practical nature.
On the whole, the only proof of guilt actually used, against all norms
of current legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself.
As subsequent probing has proven, "confessions" were acquired through
physical pressures against the accused. This led to glaring violations
of revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely innocent
individuals - [persons] who in the past had defended the party line -
became victims.
We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in their time had
opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons
for their physical annihilation. The formula "enemy of the people" was
specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such
individuals.
It is a fact that many persons who were later annihilated as enemies of
the party and people had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of
these persons had made errors during Lenin's life, but, despite this,
Lenin benefited by their work; he corrected them and he did everything
possible to retain them in the ranks of the party; he induced them to
follow him.
In this connection the delegates to the party congress should
familiarise themselves with an unpublished note by VI Lenin directed to
the central committee's politburo in October 1920. Outlining the duties
of the [party] control commission, Lenin wrote that the commission
should be transformed into a real "organ of party and proletarian
conscience.
"As a special duty of the control commission there is recommended a
deep, individualised relationship with, and sometimes even a type of
therapy for, the representatives of the so-called opposition - those who
have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their
Soviet or party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to
explain the matter to them in a way used among comrades, to find for
them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are
psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to
be formulated by the central committee's organisational bureau, etc."
Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies
of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct party line. At the
same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his
practice of directing the party demanded the most intimate party contact
with people who had shown indecision or temporary non-conformity with
the party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party path.
Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the
application of extreme methods.
Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with
cadres.
An entirely different relationship with people characterised Stalin.
Lenin's traits - patient work with people, stubborn and painstaking
education of them, the ability to induce people to follow him without
using compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them
of the whole collective - were entirely foreign to Stalin. He discarded
the Leninist method of convincing and educating, he abandoned the method
of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass
repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and
more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often
violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.
Arbitrary behaviour by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness
in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people,
execution without trial and without normal investigation created
conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation.
This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the party ranks and
of all strata of working people, but, on the contrary, brought about
annihilation and the expulsion from the party of workers who were loyal
but inconvenient to Stalin.
Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the
construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist
principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the
party's devotion to principles been skillfully combined with a keen and
solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but
rather drawn to our side, we certainly would not have had such a brutal
violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would
not have fallen victim to the method of terror. Extraordinary methods
would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in
fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.
Let us recall some historical facts.
In the days before the october revolution, two members of the central
committee of the Bolshevik party - Kamenev and Zinoviev - declared
themselves against Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. In addition, on
October 18 they published in the Menshevik newspaper, Novaya Zhizn, a
statement declaring that the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an
uprising and that they considered it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev
thus disclosed to the enemy the decision of the central committee to
stage the uprising, and that the uprising had been organised to take
place within the very near future.
This was treason against the party and against the Revolution. In this
connection, VI Lenin wrote: "Kamenev and Zinoviev revealed the decision
of the central committee of their party on the armed uprising to
[Mikhail] Rodzyanko and [Alexander] Kerensky... He put before the
central committee the question of Zinoviev's and Kamenev's expulsion
from the party."
However, after the great socialist october revolution, as is known,
Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions. Lenin put them in
positions in which they carried out most responsible party tasks and
participated actively in the work of the leading party and Soviet
organs. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of
other serious errors during Lenin's life. In his "testament" Lenin
warned that "Zinoviev's and Kamenev's October episode was of course not
an accident." But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and
certainly not their shooting.
Or, let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present, after a
sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with
the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyse this matter with
sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose
origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them
belonged to the party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited
from among the workers. We can name many individuals who, in their time,
joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active
part in the workers' movement before the revolution, during the
socialist october revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of
the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with
Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to
annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that, had Lenin lived,
such an extreme method would not have been used against any of them.
Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did
not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the
revolution when this was actually necessary? No; no one can say this.
Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the
revolution and of the working class and when necessary resorted
ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall only VI Lenin's fight with
the socialist revolutionary organisers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with
the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin
without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the enemies.
Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and
not against those who blunder, who err, and whom it was possible to lead
through ideological influence and even retain in the leadership. Lenin
used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the
exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing
the revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming
the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.
Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at
a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state
was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated
and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national
economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had
strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically.
It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his
intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving
his political correctness and mobilising the masses, he often chose the
path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual
enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes
against the party and the Soviet Government. Here we see no wisdom but
only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed VI
Lenin.
Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, the central
committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This
revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the
incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his
unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the
central committee, not asking for the opinion of the committee members
nor even of the members of the central committee's politburo; often he
did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very
important party and government matters.
Considering the question of the cult of an individual, we must first of
all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the party's role and
significance in the direction of the socialist government of workers and
peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for a successful
building of socialism in our country. Pointing to the great
responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as ruling party of the Soviet
state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of
party life; he called for the realisation of the principles of
collegiality in the direction of the party and the state.
Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our party, a
party built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means,"
said Lenin, "that all party matters are accomplished by all party
members - directly or through representatives - who, without any
exceptions, are subject to the same rules; in addition, all
administrative members, all directing collegia, all holders of party
positions are elective, they must account for their activities and are
recallable."
It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful
observance of these principles. There was no matter so important that
Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice and approval of the
majority of the central committee members or of the members of the
central committee's politburo. In the most difficult period for our
party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to
convoke congresses, party conferences and plenary sessions of the
central committee at which all the most important questions were
discussed and where resolutions, carefully worked out by the collective
of leaders, were approved.
We can recall, for an
example, the year 1918 when the country was threatened by the attack of
the imperialistic interventionists. In this situation the 7th party
congress was convened in order to discuss a vitally important matter
which could not be postponed - the matter of peace. In 1919, while the
civil war was raging, the 8th party congress convened which adopted a
new party program, decided such important matters as the relationship
with the peasant masses, the organisation of the red army, the leading
role of the party in the work of the soviets, the correction of the
social composition of the party, and other matters. In 1920 the 9th
party congress was convened which laid down guiding principles
pertaining to the party's work in the sphere of economic construction.
In 1921 the 10th party congress accepted Lenin's new economic policy and
the historic resolution called "On Party Unity."
During Lenin's life, party congresses were convened regularly; always,
when a radical turn in the development of the party and the country took
place, Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the party discuss
at length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and foreign
policy and to questions bearing on the development of party and
government.
It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the party congress as
the highest party organ his last articles, letters and remarks. During
the period between congresses, the central committee of the party,
acting as the most authoritative leading collective, meticulously
observed the principles of the party and carried out its policy.
So it was during Lenin's life. Were our party's holy Leninist principles
observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?
Whereas, during the first few years after Lenin's death, party
congresses and central committee plenums took place more or less
regularly, later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power,
these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident
during the last 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when
over 13 years elapsed between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses, years
during which our party and our country had experienced so many important
events? These events demanded categorically that the party should have
passed resolutions pertaining to the country's defense during the
[Great] Patriotic War and to peacetime construction after the war.
Even after the end of the war a congress was not convened for over seven
years. Central committee plenums were hardly ever called. It should be
sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not
a single central committee plenum took place. It is true that there was
an attempt to call a central committee plenum in October 1941, when
central committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow.
They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin
did not even want to meet and talk to the central committee members.
This fact shows how demoralised Stalin was in the first months of the
war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the central committee
members.
In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the
Leninist principle of collective party leadership.
Stalin's willfulness vis-a-vis the party and its central committee
became fully evident after the 17th party congress, which took place in
1934.
Having at its disposal numerous data showing brutal willfulness toward
party cadres, the central committee has created a party commission under
the control of the central committee's presidium. It has been charged
with investigating what made possible mass repressions against the
majority of the central committee members and candidates elected at the
17th congress of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks).
The commission has become acquainted with a large quantity of materials
in the NKVD archives and with other documents. It has established many
facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against communists, to
false accusations, [and] to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which
resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many
party, Soviet and economic activists who in 1937-1938 were branded
"enemies" were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were
always honest communists. They were merely stigmatised [as enemies].
Often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves
(at the order of the investigative judges/falsifiers) with all kinds of
grave and unlikely crimes.
The commission has presented to the central committee's presidium
lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against
the delegates to the 17th party congress and against members of the
central committee elected at that congress. These materials have been
studied by the presidium.
It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the central
committee who were elected at the 17th congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70
per cent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). (Indignation in
the hall.) What was the composition of the delegates to the 17th
congress? It is known that 80 per cent of the voting participants of the
17th congress joined the carty during the years of conspiracy before the
revolution and during the civil war, i.e. meaning before 1921. By social
origin the basic mass of the delegates to the congress were workers (60
per cent of the voting members).
For this reason, it is inconceivable that a congress so composed could
have elected a central committee in which a majority [of the members]
would prove to be enemies of the party. The only reasons why 70 per cent
of the central committee members and candidates elected at the 17th
congress were branded as enemies of the party and of the people were
because honest communists were slandered, accusations against them were
fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.
The same fate met not only central committee members but also the
majority of the delegates to the 17th party congress. Of 1,966 delegates
with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on
charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a
majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common
sense were the charges of counterrevolutionary crimes made out, as we
now see, against a majority of participants at the 17th party congress.
(Indignation in the hall.)
We should recall that the 17th party congress is known historically as
the congress of victors. Delegates to the congress were active
participants in the building of our socialist state; many of them
suffered and fought for party interests during the pre-revolutionary
years in the conspiracy and at the civil-war fronts; they fought their
enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death.
How, then, can we believe that such people could prove to be "two-faced"
and had joined the camps of the enemies of socialism during the era
after the political liquidation of Zinovievites, Trotskyites and
rightists and after the great accomplishments of socialist construction?
This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use
mass terror against party cadres.
What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased
more and more after the 17th party congress? It was because at that time
Stalin had so elevated himself above the party and above the nation that
he ceased to consider either the central committee or the party.
Stalin still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the 17th
congress. After the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites,
Zinovievites and Bukharinites, however, when the party had achieved
unity, Stalin to an ever greater degree stopped considering the members
of the party's central committee and even the members of the plitburo.
Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and that all he
needed were statisticians. He treated all others in such a way that they
could only listen to him and praise him.
After the criminal murder of Sergey M Kirov, mass repressions and brutal
acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the evening of
December 1, 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the
plitburo - which was given two days later, casually), the secretary of
the presidium of the central executive committee, [Abel] Yenukidze,
signed the following directive:
"1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those
accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.
"2. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death
sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to consider the
possibility of pardon, because the presidium of the central executive
committee of the USSR does not consider as possible the receiving of
petitions of this sort.
"3. The organs of the commissariat of internal affairs [NKVD] are
directed to execute the death sentences against criminals of the
above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences."
This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against socialist
legality. During many of the fabricated court cases, the accused were
charged with "the preparation" of terroristic acts; this deprived them
of any possibility that their cases might be re-examined, even when they
stated before the court that their "confessions" were secured by force,
and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against
them.
It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding
Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious
and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the
suspicion that the killer of Kirov, [Leonid] Nikolayev, was assisted by
someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of
Kirov.
A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the
grounds of suspicious behaviour but he was released and not even
searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the
Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an
interrogation, on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a car 'accident' in
which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of
Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light
sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot
in order to cover up the traces of the organisers of Kirov's killing.
(Movement in the hall.)
Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram
from Stalin and [Andrey] Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on September 25,
1936, was addressed to [Lazar] Kaganovich, [Vyacheslav] Molotov and
other members of the politburo. The content of the telegram was as
follows:
"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that comrade [Nikolay]
Yezhov be nominated to the post of people's commissar for internal
affairs. [Genrikh] Yagoda definitely has proven himself incapable of
unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is four years behind
in this matter. This is noted by all party workers and by the majority
of the representatives of the NKVD."
Strictly speaking, we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and,
therefore, could not know the opinion of party workers.
This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD is four years behind" in
applying mass repression and that there is a necessity for "catching up"
with the neglected work directly pushed the NKVD workers on the path of
mass arrests and executions.
We should state that this formulation was also forced on the
February-March plenary session of the central committee of the All-Union
Communist party (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary resolution approved it
on the basis of Yezhov's report, lessons flowing from the harmful
activity, diversion and espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite
agents, stating:
"The plenum of the central committee of the All-Union Communist party
(Bolsheviks) considers that all facts revealed during the investigation
into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and of its followers
in the provinces show that the people's commissariat of Internal Affairs
has fallen behind at least four years in the attempt to unmask these
most inexorable enemies of the people."
The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight
against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at this time actually
constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet state? We should
recall that in 1927, on the eve of the 15th Party congress, only some
4,000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition while
there were 724,000 for the party line. During the 10 years which passed
between the 15th Party congress and the February-March central committee
plenum, Trotskyism was completely disarmed. Many former Trotskyites
changed their former views and worked in the various sectors building
socialism. It is clear that in the situation of socialist victory there
was no basis for mass terror in the country.
Stalin's report at the February-March central committee plenum in 1937,
Deficiencies of party work and methods for the liquidation of the
Trotskyites and of other two-facers, contained an attempt at theoretical
justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that class war
must allegedly sharpen as we march forward toward socialism. Stalin
asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.
Actually Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary violence is
necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting classes, and this
referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were
powerful. As soon as the nation's political situation had improved, when
in January 1920 the red army took Rostov and thus won a most important
victory over [General A. I. ] Denikin, Lenin instructed [Felix]
Dzerzhinsky to stop mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin
justified this important political move of the Soviet state in the
following manner in his report at the session of the All-Union central
executive committee on February 2, 1920:
"We were forced to use terror because of the terror practiced by the
entente, when strong world powers threw their hordes against us, not
avoiding any type of conduct. We would not have lasted two days had we
not answered these attempts of officers and white guardists in a
merciless fashion; this meant the use of terror, but this was forced
upon us by the terrorist methods of the entente.
"But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before the end of
the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up the use of the
death penalty and thus proved that we intend to execute our own program
in the manner that we promised. We say that the application of violence
flows out of the decision to smother the exploiters, the big landowners
and the capitalists; as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use
of all extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."
Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin. Stalin put
the party and the NKVD up to the use of mass terror when the exploiting
classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no
serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.
This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the defeated
exploiting classes but against the honest workers of the party and of
the Soviet state; against them were made lying, slanderous and absurd
accusations concerning "two-facedness," "espionage," "sabotage,"
preparation of fictitious "plots," etc.
At the February-March central committee plenum in 1937 many members
actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding
mass repressions under the pretext of combating "two-facedness."
Comrade [Pavel] Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He said: "I
have philosophised that the severe years of fighting have passed. Party
members who have lost their backbones have broken down or have joined
the camp of the enemy; healthy elements have fought for the party. These
were the years of industrialisation and collectivisation. I never
thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Karpov and
people like him would find themselves in the camp of the enemy. Karpov
was a worker in the Ukrainian central committee whom Postyshev knew
well. And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was
recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites.
"I personally do not believe that in 1934 an honest party member who had
trod the long road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the party
and for socialism would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not
believe it ... I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with
the party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the
Trotskyites. It is an odd thing ..."
(Movement in the hall.)
Using Stalin's formulation, namely, that the closer we are to socialism
the more enemies we will have, and using the resolution of the
February-March central committee plenum passed on the basis of Yezhov's
report, the provocateurs who had infiltrated the state-security organs
together with conscienceless careerists began to protect with the party
name the mass terror against party cadres, cadres of the Soviet state,
and ordinary Soviet citizens. It should suffice to say that the number
of arrests based on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes had grown
ten times between 1936 and 1937.
It is known that brutal willfulness was practiced against leading party
workers. The [relevant] party statute, approved at the 17th party
congress, was based on Leninist principles expressed at the 10th party
congress. It stated that, in order to apply an extreme method such as
exclusion from the party against a central committee member, against a
central committee candidate or against a member of the party control
commission, "it is necessary to call a central committee plenum and to
invite to the plenum all central committee candidate members and all
members of the party control commission"; only if two-thirds of the
members of such a general assembly of responsible party leaders found it
necessary, only then could a central committee member or candidate be
expelled.
The majority of those central committee's members and candidates who
were elected at the 17th congress and arrested in 1937-1938 were
expelled from the party illegally through brutal abuse of the party
statute, because the question of their expulsion was never studied at
the central committee plenum.
Now, when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and "saboteurs"
were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. The
confessions of guilt of many of those arrested and charged with enemy
activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures.
At the same time, Stalin, as we have been informed by members of the
politburo of that time, did not show them the statements of many accused
political activists when they retracted their confessions before the
military tribunal and asked for an objective examination of their cases.
There were many such declarations, and Stalin doubtless knew of them.
The central committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the
congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the members of the
party's central committee elected at the 17th party congress.
An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal
violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate
for the central committee politburo, one of the most eminent workers of
the party and of the Soviet government, comrade [Robert] Eikhe, who had
been a party member since 1905.
(Commotion in the hall.)
Comrade Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938 on the basis of slanderous
materials, without the sanction of the [state] prosecutor of the USSR.
This was finally received 15 months after the arrest.
The investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most
brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by willfulness and
falsification.
Under torture, Eikhe was forced to sign a protocol of his confession
prepared in advance by the investigative judges. In it, he and several
other eminent party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activity.
On October 1, 1939 Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which he
categorically denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case.
In the declaration he wrote: "There is no more bitter misery than to sit
in the jail of a government for which I have always fought."
A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved, which he sent to
Stalin on October 27, 1939. In it [Eikhe] cited facts very convincingly
and countered the slanderous accusations made against him, arguing that
this provocatory accusation was on one hand the work of real Trotskyites
whose arrests he had sanctioned as first secretary of the West Siberian
regional party committee and who conspired in order to take revenge on
him, and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of
materials by the investigative judges.
Eikhe wrote in his declaration: "... On October 25 of this year I was
informed that the investigation in my case has been concluded and I was
given access to the materials of this investigation. Had I been guilty
of only one hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I would not
have dared to send you this pre-execution declaration. However I have
not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my
heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life
told you a word of falsehood, and now, finding both feet in the grave, I
am still not lying. My whole case is a typical example of provocation,
slander and violation of the elementary basis of revolutionary
legality...
"... The confessions which were made part of my file are not only absurd
but contain slander toward the central committee of the All-Union
Communist party (Bolsheviks) and toward the council of people's
commissars. [This is] because correct resolutions of the central
committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) and of the
council of people's commissars which were not made on my initiative and
[were promulgated] without my participation are presented as hostile
acts of counter-revolutionary organisations made at my suggestion.
"I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life and to my
really grave guilt against the party and against you. This is my
confession of counter-revolutionary activity ... The case is as follows:
Not being able to suffer the tortures to which I was submitted by [Z]
Ushakov and Nikolayev - especially by the former, who utilised the
knowledge that my broken ribs have not properly mended and have caused
me great pain - I have been forced to accuse myself and others.
"The majority of my confession has been suggested or dictated by
Ushakov. The rest is my reconstruction of NKVD materials from Western
Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility. If some part of the
story which Ushakov fabricated and which I signed did not properly hang
together, I was forced to sign another variation. The same thing was
done to [Moisey] Rukhimovich, who was at first designated as a member of
the reserve net and whose name later was removed without telling me
anything about it. The same also was done with the leader of the reserve
net, supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first I wrote my [own]
name in, and then I was instructed to insert [Valery] Mezhlauk's. There
were other similar incidents.
"... I am asking and begging you that you again examine my case, and
this not for the purpose of sparing me but in order to unmask the vile
provocation which, like a snake, wound itself around many persons in a
great degree due to my meanness and criminal slander. I have never
betrayed you or the party. I know that I perish because of vile and mean
work of enemies of the party and of the people, who have fabricated the
provocation against me."
It would appear that such an important declaration was worth an
examination by the central committee. This, however, was not done. The
declaration was transmitted to Beria while the terrible maltreatment of
the politburo candidate, comrade Eikhe, continued.
On February 2, 1940, Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he did not
confess any guilt and said as follows: "In all the so-called confessions
of mine there is not one letter written by me with the exception of my
signatures under the protocols, which were forced from me. I have made
my confession under pressure from the investigative judge, who from the
time of my arrest tormented me. After that I began to write all this
nonsense ... The most important thing for me is to tell the court, the
party and Stalin that I am not guilty. I have never been guilty of any
conspiracy. I will die believing in the truth of party policy as I have
believed in it during my whole life."
On February 4, Eikhe was shot.
(Indignation in the hall.)
It has been definitely established now that Eikhe's case was fabricated.
He has been rehabilitated posthumously.
Comrade [Yan] Rudzutak, a candidate-member of the politburo, a member of
the party since 1905 who spent 10 years in a Tsarist hard-labor camp,
completely retracted in court the confession forced from him. The
protocol of the session of the collegium of the supreme military court
contains the following statement by Rudzutak:
"... The only plea which [the defendant] places before the court is that
the central committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) be
informed that there is in the NKVD an as yet not liquidated center which
is craftily manufacturing cases, which forces innocent persons to
confess. There is no opportunity to prove one's non-participation in
crimes to which the confessions of various persons testify. The
investigative methods are such that they force people to lie and to
slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those who already stand
accused. [The defendant] asks the court that he be allowed to inform the
central committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) about
all this in writing. He assures the court that he personally had never
any evil designs in regard to the policy of our party because he has
always agreed with party policy concerning all spheres of economic and
cultural activity."
This declaration of Rudzutak was ignored, despite the fact that Rudzutak
was in his time the head of the central control commission - which had
been called into being, in accordance with Lenin's conception, for the
purpose of fighting for party unity. In this manner fell the head of
this highly authoritative party organ, a victim of brutal willfulness.
He was not even called before the politburo because Stalin did not want
to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was
shot.
(Indignation in the hall.)
After careful examination of the case in 1955, it was established that
the accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it was based on
slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously.
The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious
"anti-Soviet centers" and "blocs" with the help of provocatory methods
is seen from the confession of comrade Rozenblum, a party member since
1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad NKVD.
During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case, Rozenblum revealed
the following fact: when Rozenblum was arrested in 1937, he was
subjected to terrible torture during which he was ordered to confess
false information concerning himself and other persons. He was then
brought to the office of [Leonid] Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on
condition that he make before the court a false confession fabricated in
1937 by the NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a
terroristic center in Leningrad." (Movement in the hall.) With
unbelievable cynicism, Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the
crafty creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."
"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum, "Zakovsky gave me
several possible variants of the organisation of this center and of its
branches. After he detailed the organisation to me, Zakovsky told me
that the NKVD would prepare the case of this centre, remarking that the
trial would be public. Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5
members of this center: [Mikhail] Chudov, [Fyodor] Ugarov, [Pyotr]
Smorodin, [Boris] Pozern, Chudov's wife [Liudmilla] Shaposhnikova and
others together with 2 or 3 members from the branches of this centre...
"... The case of the Leningrad center has to be built solidly, and for
this reason witnesses are needed. Social origin (of course, in the past)
and the party standing of the witness will play more than a small role.
"'You, yourself,' said Zakovsky, 'will not need to invent anything. The
NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the
centre. You will have to study it carefully, and remember well all
questions the court might ask and their answers. This case will be ready
in four or five months, perhaps in half a year. During all this time you
will be preparing yourself so that you will not compromise the
investigation and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial
goes and on its results. If you begin to lie and to testify falsely,
blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and
we will feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death.'"
This is the kind of vile
thing practiced then.
(Movement in the hall.)
Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced in the
provinces. The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov province "discovered" a
so-called "Ural uprising staff" - an organ of the bloc of rightists,
Trotskyites, socialist revolutionaries, and church leaders - whose chief
supposedly was the secretary of the Sverdlov provincial party committee
and member of the central committee, All-Union Communist party
(Bolsheviks), [Ivan] Kabakov, who had been a party member since 1914.
Investigative materials of that time show that in almost all regions,
provinces and republics there supposedly existed "rightist Trotskyite,
espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organisations and centers"
and that the heads of such organisations as a rule - for no known reason
- were First Secretaries of provincial or republican Communist party
committees or central committees.
Many thousands of honest and innocent communists have died as a result
of this monstrous falsification of such "cases," as a result of the fact
that all kinds of slanderous "confessions" were accepted, and as a
result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and
others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases" against eminent
party and state workers - [Stanislav] Kosior, [Vlas] Chubar, [Pavel]
Postyshev, [Alexander] Kosarev, and others.
In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based
on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the
party.
The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of
persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the military
collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov would
send these [execution] lists to Stalin personally for his approval of
the proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the
names of many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army, and economic
workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.
A large part of these cases are being reviewed now. A great many are
being voided because they were baseless and falsified. Suffice it to say
that from 1954 to the present time the military collegium of the supreme
court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom have been
rehabilitated posthumously.
Mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused
tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist
advancement.
Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political
condition of the party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed
to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among
communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.
Resolutions of the January, 1938 Central committee plenum brought some
measure of improvement to party organisations. However, widespread
repression also existed in 1938.
Only because our party has at its disposal such great moral-political
strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in
1937-1938 and to educate new cadres. There is, however, no doubt that
our march forward toward socialism and toward the preparation of the
country's defense would have been much more successful were it not for
the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless
and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.
We are accusing Yezhov justly for the degenerate practices of 1937. But
we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov have arrested Kosior,
for instance, without Stalin's knowledge? Was there an exchange of
opinions or a politburo decision concerning this?
No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type.
Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such
eminent party figures?
No, it would be a display of naiveté to consider this the work of Yezhov
alone. It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that
without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not have done this.
We have examined these cases and have rehabilitated Kosior, Rudzutak,
Postyshev, Kosarev and others. For what causes were they arrested and
sentenced? Our review of evidence shows that there was no reason for
this. They, like many others, were arrested without prosecutorial
knowledge.
In such a situation, there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of
a sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything? He was the
chief prosecutor in these cases. Stalin not only agreed to arrest orders
but issued them on his own initiative. We must say this so that the
delegates to the congress can clearly undertake and themselves assess
this and draw the proper conclusions.
Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin's orders without
reckoning with any norms of party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very
distrustful man, sickly suspicious. We know this from our work with him.
He could look at a man and say: "Why are your eyes so shifty today?" or
"Why are you turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in
the eyes?" The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even
toward eminent party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and
in everything he saw "enemies," "two-facers" and "spies." Possessing
unlimited power, he indulged in great willfulness and stifled people
morally as well as physically. A situation was created where one could
not express one's own volition.
When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was
necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of the people."
Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of state security, outdid
itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials
which it falsified. And what proofs were offered? The confessions of the
arrested, and the investigative judges accepted these "confessions". And
how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not
committed? Only in one way - because of the application of physical
methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of
unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away of his human
dignity. In this manner were "confessions" acquired.
The wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939. When the leaders of
territorial party organisations began to accuse NKVD workers of using
methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded
telegram on January 20, 1939 to the committee secretaries of provinces
and regions, to the central committees of republican communist parties,
to the [republican] people's commissars of internal affairs and to the
heads of NKVD organisations. This telegram stated:
"The central committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks)
explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in NKVD
practice is permissible from 1937 on in accordance with permission of
the central committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) ...
It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of
physical influence against representatives of the socialist proletariat
and that they use them in their most scandalous forms.
"The question arises as to why the socialist intelligence service should
be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against
the deadly enemies of the working class and of kolkhoz workers. The
central committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks)
considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as
an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as
a method both justifiable and appropriate."
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the central committee of the
All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of
socialist legality, torture and oppression, which led as we have seen to
the slandering and to the self-accusation of innocent people.
Not long ago - only several days before the present congress - we called
to the central committee presidium session and interrogated the
investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated
Kosior, Chubar and Kosarev. He is a vile person, with the brain of a
bird, and completely degenerate morally. It was this man who was
deciding the fate of prominent party workers. He also was making
judgments concerning the politics in these matters, because, having
established their "crime," he thereby provided materials from which
important political implications could be drawn.
The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could-by himelf-have
conducted his investigations in a manner proving the guilt of people
such as Kosior and others. No, he could not have done it without proper
directives. At the central committee presidium session he told us: "I
was told that Kosior and Chubar were people's enemies and for this
reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they
were enemies."
(Indignation in the hall.)
He would do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving
detailed instructions from Beria. We must say that at the central
committee presidium session he cynically declared: "I thought that I was
executing the orders of the party." In this manner, Stalin's orders
concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested
were carried out in practice.
These and many other facts show that all norms of correct party solution
of problems were [in]validated and that everything was dependent upon
the willfulness of one man.
The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious
consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
When we look at many of our novels, films and historical-scientific
studies, the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely
improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet army, on the
basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the
tactics of so-called "active defence," i.e., tactics which, as we know,
allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such
tactics, the Soviet army, supposedly thanks only to Stalin's genius,
turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained
through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our heroic
people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific study"
as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.
We have to analyse this matter carefully because it has a tremendous
significance not only from the historical, but especially from the
political, educational and practical points of view. What are the facts
of this matter?
Before the war, our press and all our political-educational work was
characterised by its bragging tone: When an enemy violates the holy
Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer with three,
and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much
harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all
areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of
our borders.
During the war and after the war, Stalin advanced the thesis that the
tragedy our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the
result of an "unexpected" attack by the Germans against the Soviet
Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came
to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating
communism. The fascists were saying this openly. They did not hide their
plans.
In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs
were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from
the prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin
a war against the Soviet state, and that he had concentrated large
armies, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.
Documents which have now been published show that [as early as] April 3,
1941 Churchill, through his ambassador to the USSR, [Sir Stafford]
Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping
their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union.
It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his
friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in this his own
imperialistic goals - to bring Germany and the USSR into a bloody war
and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire.
All the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to "warn
Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him".
Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18 and on
the following days. However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings. What
is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this
sort, so as not to provoke the initiation of military operations.
We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of
German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our
own military and diplomatic sources. However, because the leadership was
conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear
and assessed with reservation. Thus, for instance, information sent from
Berlin on May 6, 1941 by the Soviet military (sic) attaché, Captain
(sic) Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet citizen Bozer ... communicated to the
Deputy naval attaché that, according to a statement of a certain German
officer from Hitler's headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the
USSR on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the
same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers
landed in border cities ..."
In his report of May 22, 1941, the deputy military attaché in Berlin,
Khlopov, communicated that "... the attack of the German army is
reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin
in the first days of June ..."
A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941 stated: "As of now
Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict
between Germany and the USSR, which will begin not later than the middle
of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated
147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet
borders ..."
Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not
taken to prepare the country properly for defence and to prevent it from
being caught unawares.
Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes, we had
the time and the capability. Our industry was already so developed that
it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet army with everything that
it needed. This is proven by the fact that, although during the war we
lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and
food-production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine,
Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet
nation was still able to organise the production of military equipment
in the eastern parts of the country, to install there equipment taken
from the western industrial areas, and to supply our armed forces with
everything necessary to destroy the enemy.
Had our industry been mobilised properly and in time to supply the army
with the necessary material, our wartime losses would have been
decidedly smaller. However such mobilisation had not been started in
time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that
our army was badly armed. We did not have enough artillery, tanks and
planes to throw the enemy back.
Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and
artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not
organised. As a matter of fact, we started to modernise our military
equipment only on the eve of the war. As a result, when the enemy
invaded Soviet territory we did not have sufficient quantities either of
old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new
machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production.
The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was especially bad. We did
not organise the production of anti-tank ammunition. Many fortified
regions proved to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because
their old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available
there.
This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes. At the
outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to
arm the mobilised manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned
from Kiev to comrade [Georgy] Malenkov and told him, "People have
volunteered for the new army [units] and are demanding weapons. You must
send us arms."
Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We are sending all our
rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves."
(Movement in the hall.)
Such was the armament situation.
In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact:
shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler's army,
[Colonel-General M. P.] Kirponos, who was chief of the Kiev special
military district (he was later killed at the front), wrote to Stalin
that German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack
and in the very near future would probably start their offensive. In
this connection, Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organised,
that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border areas and that several
strong points be organised there: anti-tank ditches, trenches for the
soldiers, etc.
Moscow answered this proposition with the assertions that this would be
a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken
at the borders, and that the Germans were not to be given any pretext
for the initiation of military action against us. Thus our borders were
insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.
When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and
military operations began, Moscow issued an order that German fire was
not to be returned. Why? It was because Stalin, despite the self-evident
facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a
provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the
German army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the
Germans to begin the war.
The following fact is also known: on the eve of the invasion of Soviet
territory by Hitler's army, a certain German citizen crossed our border
and stated that the German armies had received orders to start [their]
offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22 at 3 o'clock.
Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was
ignored.
As you see, everything was ignored: warnings of certain army commanders,
declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open
hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of the alertness of the chief
of the party and of the state at this particularly significant
historical moment?
And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of
clear facts? The result was that already in the first hours and days the
enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our air force,
our artillery and other military equipment. [Stalin] annihilated large
numbers of our military cadres and disorganised our military leadership.
Consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the
country.
Very grievous consequences, especially with regard to the beginning of
the war, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and
political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and
through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were
instituted against certain parts of our military cadres beginning
literally at the company- and battalion-commander levels and extending
to higher military centers. During this time, the cadre of leaders who
had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost
completely liquidated.
The policy of large-scale repression against military cadres led also to
undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of
all ranks and even soldiers in party and Komsomol cells were taught to
"unmask" their superiors as hidden enemies.
(Movement in the hall.)
It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of
military discipline in the initial stage of the war.
And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which
were unquestionably loyal to the party and to the fatherland. Suffice it
to say that those of them who managed to survive, despite severe
tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the
first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for
the glory of the fatherland. I have here in mind such [generals] as:
[Konstantin] Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed);
[Alexander] Gorbatov; [Kiril] Meretskov (who is a delegate at the
present Congress); [K. P.] Podlas (he was an excellent commander who
perished at the front); and many, many others. However, many such
commanders perished in the camps and the jails and the army saw them no
more.
All this brought about a situation at the beginning of the war that was
a great threat to our fatherland.
It would be wrong to forget that, after severe initial disaster and
defeat at the front, Stalin thought that it was the end. In one of his
[declarations] in those days he said: "Lenin left us a great legacy and
we've lost it forever."
After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct military
operations and ceased to do anything whatsoever. He returned to active
leadership only when a politburo delegation visited him and told him
that steps needed to be taken immediately so as to improve the situation
at the front.
Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our Fatherland in the
initial period of the war was largely due to Stalin's very own faulty
methods of directing the nation and the party.
However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which
led to our Army's serious disorganisation and brought us severe losses.
Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin
demonstrated while interfering with actual military operations caused
our army serious damage.
Stalin was very far from understanding the real situation that was
developing at the front. This was natural because, during the whole
patriotic war, he never visited any section of the front or any
liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway during
a stabilised situation at the front. To this incident were dedicated
many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many
paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and
issuing orders which did not take into consideration the real situation
at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in
huge personnel losses.
I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic
fact which illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the fronts.
Present at this congress is Marshal [Ivan] Bagramyan, who was once the
head of operations in the southwestern front headquarters and who can
corroborate what I will tell you.
When an exceptionally serious situation for our army developed in the
Kharkov region in 1942, we correctly decided to drop an operation whose
objective was to encircle [the city]. The real situation at that time
would have threatened our army with fatal consequences if this operation
were continued.
We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded
changes in [our] operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented
from liquidating a sizable concentration of our army.
Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion. He issued the
order to continue the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at
this time many army concentrations actually were threatened with
encirclement and liquidation.
I telephoned to [Marshal Alexander] Vasilevsky and begged him:
"Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map" - Vasilevsky is present here - "and
show comrade Stalin the situation that has developed." We should note
that Stalin planned operations on a globe.
(Animation in the hall.)
Yes, comrades, he used to take a globe and trace the front line on it. I
said to comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the situation on a map. In the
present situation we cannot continue the operation which was planned.
The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause."
Vasilevsky replied, saying that Stalin had already studied this problem.
He said that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning
this matter, because the latter didn't want to hear any arguments on the
subject of this operation.
After my talk with Vasilevsky, I telephoned to Stalin at his dacha. But
Stalin did not answer the phone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told
comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to
speak personally to Stalin. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I
should speak with Malenkov. I stated for the second time that I wished
to inform Stalin personally about the grave situation which had arisen
for us at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to pick
up the phone and again stated that I should speak to him through
Malenkov, although he was only a few steps from the telephone.
After "listening" in this manner to our plea, Stalin said: "Let
everything remain as it is!" And what was the result of this? The worst
we had expected. The Germans surrounded our army concentrations and as a
result [the Kharkov counterattack] lost hundreds of thousands of our
soldiers. This is Stalin's military "genius." This is what it cost us.
(Movement in the hall.)
On one occasion after the war, during a meeting between Stalin and
members of the Politburo, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that
Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the
Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had
not been accepted.
You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted that he,
Stalin, had not been right! He is after all a "genius" and a genius
cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that
he never erred, that he was always right. He never acknowledged to
anyone that he made any mistake, large or small, despite the fact that
he made more than a few in matters of theory and in his practical
activity. After the party congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate
many wartime military operations and present them in their true light.
The tactics on which Stalin insisted - without knowing the basics of
conducting battle operations - cost much blood until we succeeded in
stopping the opponent and going over to the offensive.
The military knows that as late as the end of 1941, instead of great
operational manoeuvres flanking our opponent and penetrating behind his
back, Stalin was demanding incessant frontal counter-attacks and the
re-capture of one village after another.
Because of this, we paid with great losses - until our generals, upon
whose shoulders the whole weight of conducting the war rested, succeeded
in altering the situation and shifting to flexible-manoeuvre operations.
[This] immediately brought serious changes at the front favourable to
us.
All the more shameful was the fact that after our great victory over the
enemy, which cost us so dearly, Stalin began to downgrade many of the
commanders who had contributed so much to it. [This was] because Stalin
ruled out any chance that services rendered at the front might be
credited to anyone but himself.
Stalin was very much interested in assessments of comrade [Grigory]
Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov.
I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time. He is a good
general and a good military leader."
After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense about Zhukov.
Among it the following: "You praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it.
They say that before each operation at the front Zhukov used to behave
as follows: he used to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We
can begin the attack,' or its opposite, 'The planned operation cannot be
carried out.'" I stated at the time, "comrade Stalin, I do not know who
invented this, but it is not true."
It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose
of minimising the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.
In this connection, Stalin very energetically popularised himself as a
great leader. In various ways he tried to inculcate the notion that the
victories gained by the Soviet nation during the Great Patriotic War
were all due to the courage, daring, and genius of Stalin and of no one
else. Just like [a] Kuzma Kryuchkov, he put one dress on seven people at
the same time.
(Animation in the hall.)
In the same vein, let us take for instance our historical and military
films and some [of our] literary creations. They make us feel sick.
Their true objective is propagating the theme of praising Stalin as a
military genius. Let us recall the film, The Fall of Berlin. Here only
Stalin acts. He issues orders in a hall in which there are many empty
chairs. Only only one man approaches him to report something to him - it
is [Alexander] Poskrebyshev, his loyal shield-bearer.
(Laughter in the hall.)
And where is the military command? Where is the politburo? Where is the
government? What are they doing, and with what are they engaged? There
is nothing about them in the film. Stalin acts for everybody, he does
not reckon with anyone. He asks no one for advice. Everything is shown
to the people in this false light. Why? To surround Stalin with glory -
contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth.
The question arises: where
is the military, on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? It is
not in the film. With Stalin's inclusion, there was no room left for it.
Not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic
army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation -
these are the ones who assured victory in the Great Patriotic War.
(Tempestuous and prolonged applause.)
Central committee members, ministers, our economic leaders, the leaders
of Soviet culture, directors of territorial-party and Soviet
organisations, engineers, and technicians - every one of them in his own
place of work generously gave of his strength and knowledge toward
ensuring victory over the enemy.
Exceptional heroism was shown by our hard core - surrounded by glory are
our whole working class, our kolkhoz peasantry, the Soviet
intelligentsia, who under the leadership of party organisations overcame
untold hardships and bearing the hardships of war, and devoted all their
strength to the cause of the fatherland's defence.
Our Soviet women accomplished great and brave deeds during the war. They
bore on their backs the heavy load of production work in the factories,
on the kolkhozes, and in various economic and cultural sectors. Many
women participated directly in the Great Patriotic War at the front. Our
brave youth contributed immeasurably, both at the front and at home, to
the defense of the Soviet fatherland and to the annihilation of the
enemy.
The services of Soviet soldiers, of our commanders and political workers
of all ranks are immortal. After the loss of a considerable part of the
army in the initial war months, they did not lose their heads and were
able to reorganise during the course of combat. Over the course of the
war they created and toughened a strong, heroic army. They not only
withstood [our] strong and cunning enemy's pressure but smashed him.
The magnificent, heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the
East and of the West during the fight against the threat of fascist
subjugation which loomed before us will live for centuries, [indeed] for
millennia in the memory of thankful humanity.
(Thunderous applause.)
The main roles and the main credit for the victorious ending of the war
belong to our Communist party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union,
and to the tens of millions of Soviet people uplifted by the party.
(Thunderous and prolonged applause.)
Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet Union justly is
considered a model multinational state because we have assured in
practice the equality and friendship of all [of the] peoples living in
our great fatherland.
All the more monstrous are those acts whose initiator was Stalin and
which were rude violations of the basic Leninist principles [behind our]
Soviet state's nationalities policies. We refer to the mass deportations
of entire nations from their places of origin, together with all
Communists and Komsomols without any exception. This deportation was not
dictated by any military considerations.
Thus, at the end of 1943, when there already had been a permanent change
of fortune at the front in favor of the Soviet Union, a decision
concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which
they lived was taken and executed.
In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the
Kalmyks of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic. In March, 1944, all the
Chechens and Ingushi were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous
Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported from
the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic to faraway
places and their republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardian
Republic.
Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of
them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, [Stalin]
would have deported them also.
(Laughter and animation in the hall.)
No Marxist-Leninist, no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible
to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including
women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass
repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for
the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.
After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet nation proudly
stressed the magnificent victories gained through [our] great sacrifices
and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a period of political
enthusiasm. The party came out of the war even more united. Its cadres
were tempered and hardened by the fire of the war. Under such conditions
nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the
party.
And it was precisely at this time that the so-called "Leningrad affair"
was born. As we have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who
innocently lost their lives included: comrades [Nikolay] Voznesensky,
[Aleksey] Kuznetsov, [Mikhail] Rodionov, [Pyotr] Popkov, and others.
As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent
leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is sufficient to
mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first deputy to the chairman of the
council of ministers and Kuznetsov was elected secretary of the central
committee. The very fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the
supervision of the state-security organs shows the trust which he
enjoyed.
How did it happen that these persons were branded as enemies of the
people and liquidated?
Facts prove that the "Leningrad affair" is also the result of
willfulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres. Had a normal
situation existed in the party's central committee and in the central
committee politburo, affairs of this nature would have been examined
there in accordance with party practice, and all pertinent facts
assessed; as a result, such an affair as well as others would not have
happened.
We must state that, after the war, the situation became even more
complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal.
In particular, his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached
unbelievable dimensions. Many workers became enemies before his very
eyes. After the war, Stalin separated himself from the collective even
more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for
anyone or anything.
This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage of by the
abject provocateur and vile enemy, Beria, who murdered thousands of
Communists and loyal Soviet people. The elevation of Voznesensky and
Kuznetsov alarmed Beria. As we have now proven, it had been precisely
Beria who had "suggested" to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his
confidants of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous
letters, and in the form of various rumors and talks.
The party's central committee has examined this so-called "Leningrad
affair"; persons who innocently suffered are now rehabilitated and honor
has been restored to the glorious Leningrad party organisation. [VS]
Abakumov and others who had fabricated this affair were brought before a
court; their trial took place in Leningrad and they received what they
deserved.
The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this affair only
now, and why did we not do something earlier, during Stalin's life, in
order to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was because Stalin
personally supervised the "Leningrad affair," and the majority of the
politburo members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances
in these matters and could not therefore intervene.
When Stalin received certain material from Beria and Abakumov, without
examining these slanderous materials he ordered an investigation of the
"affair" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. With this, their fate was sealed.
Similarly instructive is the case of the Mingrelian nationalist
organisation which supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known,
resolutions by the central committee, Communist party of the Soviet
Union, were made concerning this case in November 1951 and in March
1952. These resolutions were made without prior discussion with the
politburo. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious
accusations against many loyal communists. On the basis of falsified
documents, it was proven that there existed in Georgia a supposedly
nationalistic organisation whose objective was the liquidation of the
Soviet power in that republic with the help of imperialist powers.
In this connection, a number of responsible party and Soviet workers
were arrested in Georgia. As was later proven, this was a slander
directed against the Georgian party organisation.
We know that there have been at times manifestations of local bourgeois
nationalism in Georgia as in several other republics. The question
arises: could it be possible that, in the period during which the
resolutions referred to above were made, nationalist tendencies grew so
much that there was a danger of Georgia's leaving the Soviet Union and
joining Turkey?
(Animation in the hall, laughter).
This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine how such
assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows how Georgia has
developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule. Industrial
production in the Georgian Republic is 27 times greater than it was
before the Revolution. Many new industries have arisen in Georgia which
did not exist there before the revolution: iron smelting, an oil
industry, a machine-construction industry, etc. Illiteracy has long
since been liquidated, which, in pre-revolutionary Georgia, included 78
per cent of the population.
Could the Georgians, comparing the situation in their republic with the
hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, be aspiring to join
Turkey? In 1955, Georgia produced 18 times as much steel per person as
Turkey. Georgia produces 9 times as much electrical energy per person as
Turkey. According to the available 1950 census, 65 per cent of Turkey's
total population is illiterate, and 80 per cent of its women. Georgia
has 19 institutions of higher learning which have about 39,000 students;
this is 8 times more than in Turkey (for each 1,000 inhabitants). The
prosperity of the working people has grown tremendously in Georgia under
Soviet rule.
It is clear that, as the economy and culture develop, and as the
socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows, the
source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates.
As it developed, there was no nationalistic organisation in Georgia.
Thousands of innocent people fell victim to willfulness and lawlessness.
All of this happened under the "genius" leadership of Stalin, "the great
son of the Georgian nation," as Georgians like to refer to him.
(Animation in the hall.)
The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning
the internal life of the country but also in the international relations
of the Soviet Union.
The July plenum of the central committee studied in detail the reasons
for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role
which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems
which could not have been solved through party discussions among
comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this
"affair." It was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of
relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that Yugoslav
leaders made no mistakes or had no shortcomings. But these mistakes and
shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, resulting
in the break-off of relations with a friendly country.
I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia began to be blown up artificially. Once, when I came from
Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin, who, pointing to the copy
of a letter recently sent to [Yugoslavian President Marshal Joseph]
Tito, asked me, "Have you read this?"
Not waiting for my reply, he answered, "I will shake my little finger -
and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."
We have paid dearly for this "shaking of the little finger". This
statement reflected Stalin's mania for greatness, but he acted just that
way: "I will shake my little finger - and there will be no Kosior"; "I
will shake my little finger once more and Postyshev and Chubar will be
no more"; "I will shake my little finger again - and Voznesensky,
Kuznetsov and many others will disappear."
But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin
shook, not only his little finger but everything else that he could
shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that, in this instance of
disagreement with our Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a state and
a people who had had a serious education in fighting for liberty and
independence, a people who gave support to its leaders.
You see what Stalin's mania for greatness led to. He completely lost
consciousness of reality. He demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness
not only in relation to individuals in the USSR, but in relation to
whole parties and nations.
We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia. We have found a
proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and
of Yugoslavia as well as by the working masses of all the people's
democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of our
abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the
whole camp of socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the
whole world.
Let us also recall the "affair of the doctor-plotters."
(Animation in the hall.)
Actually there was no "affair" outside of the declaration of the woman
doctor [Lidiya] Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by
someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the organs of
state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that
doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.
Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion
that there are doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to
arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally
issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of
interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that academician [VN]
Vinogradov should be put in chains, and that another one [of the alleged
plotters] should be beaten. The former minister of state security,
comrade [Semyen] Ignatiev, is present at this congress as a delegate.
Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the
doctors we will shorten you by a head."
(Tumult in the hall.)
Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him instructions,
and advised him on which investigative methods should be used. These
methods were simple - beat, beat and, beat again.
Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we members of the politburo
received protocols with the doctors' confessions of guilt. After
distributing these protocols, Stalin told us: "You are blind like young
kittens. What will happen without me? The country will perish because
you do not know how to recognise enemies."
The case was presented so that no one could verify the facts on which
the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to
verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.
We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was
questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had
once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we
found it to have been fabricated from beginning to end.
This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin. He did not, however, have
the time in which to bring it to an end (as he conceived that end), and
for this reason the doctors are still alive. All of them have been
rehabilitated. They are working in the same places they were working
before. They are treating top individuals, not excluding members of the
government. They have our full confidence; and they execute their duties
honestly, as they did before.
In putting together various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role
was played by a rabid enemy of our party, an agent of a foreign
intelligence service - Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence.
How could this provocateur have gained such a position in the party and
in the state, so as to become the first deputy chair of the council of
ministers of the Soviet Union and a politburo member? It has now been
established that this villain climbed up the government ladder over an
untold number of corpses.
Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the party? Yes, there
were. Already in 1937, at a central committee plenum, former people's
commissar of health [Grigory] Kaminsky said that Beria worked for the
Musavat intelligence service. But the plenum had barely concluded when
Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's
statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for
him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one could
say anything that was contrary to his opinion. Anyone daring to express
opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky.
There were other signs, also. The declaration which comrade [AV] Snegov
made to the party's Central Committee is interesting. (Parenthetically
speaking, he was also rehabilitated not long ago, after 17 years in
prison camps.) In this declaration, Snegov writes:
"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former central
committee member, [Lavrenty] Kartvelishvili-Lavrentiev, I have entrusted
to the hands of the representative of the committee of state security a
detailed deposition concerning Beria's role in the disposition of the
Kartvelishvili case and concerning the criminal motives by which Beria
was guided.
"In my opinion, it is indispensable to recall an important fact
pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the central committee,
because I did not consider it as proper to include in the investigation
documents.
"On October 30, 1931, at a session of the organisational bureau of the
central committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks),
Kartvelishvili, secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee, made
a report. All members of the executive of the regional committee were
present. Of them I alone am now alive.
"During this session, JV Stalin made a motion at the end of his speech
concerning the organisation of the secretariat of the Transcaucasian
regional committee composed of the following: first secretary,
Kartvelishvili; second secretary, Beria (it was then, for the first time
in the party's history, that Beria's name was mentioned as a candidate
for a party position). Kartvelishvili answered that he knew Beria well
and for that reason refused categorically to work together with him.
Stalin proposed then that this matter be left open and that it be solved
in the process of the work itself. Two days later a decision was arrived
at that Beria would receive the party post and that Kartvelishvili would
be deported from the Transcaucasus.
"This fact can be confirmed by comrades Mikoyan and Kaganovich, who were
present at that session."
The long, unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and Beria were
widely known. They date back to the time when comrade Sergo
[Ordzhonikidze] was active in the Transcaucasus. Kartvelishvili was the
closest assistant of Sergo. The unfriendly relationship impelled Beria
to fabricate a "case" against Kartvelishvili. It is characteristic that
Kartvelishvili was charged with a terroristic act against Beria in this
"case."
The indictment in the Beria case contains a discussion of his crimes.
Some things should, however, be recalled, especially since it is
possible that not all delegates to the congress have read this document.
I wish to recall Beria's bestial disposition of the cases of [Mikhail]
Kedrov, [V] Golubev, and Golubev's adopted mother, Baturina - persons
who wished to inform the Central Committee concerning Beria's
treacherous activity. They were shot without any trial and the sentence
was passed ex post facto, after the execution.
Here is what the old communist, comrade Kedrov, wrote to the central
committee through comrade [Andrey] Andreyev (comrade Andreyev was then a
central committee secretary):
"I am calling to you for help from a gloomy cell of the Lefortovo
prison. Let my cry of horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf, take
me under your protection; please, help remove the nightmare of
interrogations and show that this is all a mistake.
"I suffer innocently. Please believe me. Time will testify to the truth.
I am not an agent provocateur of the Tsarist Okhrana. I am not a spy, I
am not a member of an anti-Soviet organisation of which I am being
accused on the basis of denunciations. I am also not guilty of any other
crimes against the party and the government. I am an old Bolshevik, free
of any stain; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of
the party for the good and prosperity of the nation ...
"... Today I, a 62-year-old man, am being threatened by the
investigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading methods of
physical pressure. They are no longer capable of becoming aware of their
error and of recognising that their handling of my case is illegal and
impermissible. They try to justify their actions by picturing me as a
hardened and raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But
let the party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing which
can turn a loyal son of the party into an enemy, even right up to his
last dying breath.
"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the hastily
approaching new and powerful blows.
"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has reached the
extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my energy are waning, the
end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet prison, branded as a vile
traitor to the fatherland - what can be more monstrous for an honest
man? And how monstrous all this is! Unsurpassed bitterness and pain
grips my heart. No! No! This will not happen; this cannot be, I cry.
Neither the party, nor the Soviet government, nor the people's
commissar, LP Beria, will permit this cruel, ireparable injustice. I am
firmly certain that, given a quiet, objective examination, without any
foul rantings, without any anger and without the fearful tortures, it
would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply
that truth and justice will triumph. I believe. I believe."
The old Bolshevik, comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by the military
collegium. But, despite this, he was shot at Beria's order.
(Indignation in the hall.)
Beria also handled cruelly the family of comrade Ordzhonikidze. Why?
Because Ordzhonikidze had tried to prevent Beria from realising his
shameful plans. Beria had cleared from his way all persons who could
possibly interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze was always an opponent of
Beria, which he told to Stalin. Instead of examining this affair and
taking appropriate steps, Stalin allowed the liquidation of
Ordzhonikidze's brother and brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a
state that he was forced to shoot himself.
(Indignation in the hall.)
Beria was unmasked by the party's central committee shortly after
Stalin's death. As a result of particularly detailed legal proceedings,
it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes and Beria
was shot.
The question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of thousands of
party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked during Stalin's life. He was
not unmasked earlier because he had utilised very skillfully Stalin's
weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in
everything and acted with his support.
Comrades! The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size
chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported
the glorification of his own person. This is supported by numerous
facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's
self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the
edition of his Short Biography, which was published in 1948 (sic).
This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of
making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible
sage, "the greatest leader, sublime strategist of all times and
nations." Finally, no other words could be found with which to lift
Stalin up to the heavens.
We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation filling this
book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by
Stalin personally. Some of them were added in his own handwriting to the
draft text of the book.
What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book? Did he want
to cool the ardour of the flatterers who were composing his Short
Biography? No! He marked the very places where he thought that the
praise of his services was insufficient. Here are some examples
characterising Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own hand:
"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the Trotskyites,
Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there was definitely welded
together, after Lenin's death, that leading core of the party ... that
upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied the party behind Lenin's
behests, and brought the Soviet people onto the broad paths of
industrialising the country and collectivising the rural economy. The
leader of this core and the guiding force of the party and the state was
comrade Stalin."
Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:
"Although he performed his tasks as leader of the party and the people
with consummate skill, and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire
Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the
slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation."
Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this worthy of a
leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely against this did Marx
and Engels take such a strong position. This always was sharply
condemned also by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
In the draft text of [Stalin's] book appeared the following sentence:
"Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared to Stalin to be
too weak. Thus, in his own handwriting, he changed it to read: "Stalin
is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or, as it is said in our Party,
Stalin is the Lenin of today." You see how well it is said, not by the
nation but by Stalin himself.
It is possible to offer many such self-praising appraisals written into
the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand. He showers himself
especially generously with praises regarding his military genius and his
talent for strategy. I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin on
the theme: "The advanced Soviet science of war received further
development," he writes, "at comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin
elaborated the theory of the permanent operating factors that decide the
issue of wars, of active defense and the laws of counteroffensive and
offensive, of the cooperation of all services and arms in modern
warfare, of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modern war,
and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed services. At
various stages of the war, Stalin's genius found correct solutions that
took into account all the circumstances of the situation."
(Movement in the hall.)
Further, Stalin writes: "Stalin's military mastership was displayed both
in defense and on offense. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to divine
the enemy's plans and defeat them. The battles in which comrade Stalin
directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of operational
military skill."
This is how Stalin was praised as a strategist. Who did this? Stalin
himself, not in his role as a strategist but in the role of an
author-editor, one of the main creators of his [own] self-adulatory
biography. Such, comrades, are the facts. Or should be said, rather, the
shameful facts.
One additional fact from the same Short Biography of Stalin: As is
known, the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short
Course was written by a commission of the party central committee.
This book, parenthetically, was also permeated with the cult of the
individual and was written by a designated group of authors. This fact
was reflected in the following formulation on the proof copy of the
Short Biography of Stalin: "A commission of the central committee,
All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks), under the direction of comrade
Stalin and with his most active personal participation, has prepared a
History of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks), Short Course."
But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin: The following sentence
replaced it in the final version of the Short Biography: "In 1938, the
book History of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks), Short Course
appeared, written by comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the
central committee, All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks)." Can one add
anything more?
(Animation in the hall.)
As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the work created by a
group into a book written by Stalin. It is not necessary to state how
and why this metamorphosis took place.
A pertinent question comes to our mind: if Stalin is the author of this
book, why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to
transform the whole post-October historical period of our glorious
Communist party solely into an action of "the Stalin genius"?
Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the party in the socialist
transformation of the country, in the construction of socialist society,
in the industrialisation and collectivisation of the country, and also
other steps taken by the party which undeviatingly traveled the path
outlined by Lenin? This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his
speeches, about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception
is tied to his name.
And when Stalin himself
asserts that he himself wrote the Short Course, this calls at least for
amazement. Can a Marxist-Leninist thus write about himself, praising his
own person to the heavens?
Or let us take the matter of the Stalin prizes.
(Movement in the hall.)
Not even the Tsars created prizes which they named after themselves.
Stalin recognised as the best a text of the national anthem of the
Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist party; it
contains, however, the following unprecedented praise of Stalin: "Stalin
brought us up in loyalty to the people. He inspired us to great toil and
deeds."
In these lines of the
anthem, the whole educational, directional and inspirational activity of
the great Leninist party is ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a
clear deviation from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling
of the role of the party. We should add for your information that the
presidium of the central committee has already passed a resolution
concerning the composition of a new text of the anthem, which will
reflect the role of the people and the role of the party.
(Loud, prolonged applause.)
And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest
enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge
that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country - these
"memorials to the living"? It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed
on July 2, 1951 a resolution of the USSR council of ministers concerning
the erection on the Volga-Don Canal of an impressive monument to Stalin;
on September 4 of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of
copper available for the construction of this impressive monument.
Anyone who has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the huge
statue which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any
people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build it at a time when people
of this area had lived since the war in huts. Consider, yourself, was
Stalin right when he wrote in his biography that "... he did not allow
in himself ... even a shadow of conceit, pride, or self-adoration"?
At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for Lenin's
memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision taken over 30
years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich,
this palace was not built, its construction was always postponed and the
project allowed to lapse.
We cannot forget to recall the Soviet government resolution of August
14, 1925 concerning "the founding of Lenin prizes for educational work."
This resolution was published in the press, but until this day there are
no Lenin prizes. This, too, should be corrected.
(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)
During Stalin's life - thanks to known methods which I have mentioned,
and quoting facts, for instance, from the Short Biography of Stalin -
all events were explained as if Lenin played only a secondary role, even
during the October Socialist revolution. In many films and in many
literary works the figure of Lenin was incorrectly presented and
inadmissibly depreciated.
Stalin loved to see the film The Unforgettable Year of 1919, in which he
was shown on the steps of an armoured train and where he was practically
vanquishing the foe with his own sabre. Let Klimenty Yefremovich
[Voroshilov], our dear friend, find the necessary courage and write the
truth about Stalin; after all, he knows how Stalin had fought. It will
be difficult for comrade Voroshilov to undertake this, but it would be
good if he did it. Everyone will approve of it, both the people and the
party. Even his grandsons will thank him.
(Prolonged applause.)
In speaking about the events of the October revolution and about the
civil war, the impression was created that Stalin always played the main
role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had suggested to Lenin what to
do and how to do it. However, this is slander of Lenin.
(Prolonged applause.)
I will probably not sin against the truth when I say that 99 per cent of
the persons present here heard and knew very little about Stalin before
the year 1924, while Lenin was known to all. He was known to the whole
party, to the whole nation, from children all the way up to old men.
(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)
All this has to be thoroughly revised so that history, literature and
the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role and the great deeds of
our Communist party and of the Soviet people - a creative people.
(Applause.)
Comrades! The cult of the individual caused the employment of faulty
principles in party work and in economic activity. It brought about rude
violation of internal party and Soviet democracy, sterile
administration, deviations of all sorts, cover-ups of shortcomings, and
varnishings of reality. Our nation bore forth many flatterers and
specialists in false optimism and deceit.
We should also not forget that, due to the numerous arrests of party,
Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly,
showed overcautiousness, feared all which was new, feared their own
shadows, and began to show less initiative in their work.
Take, for instance, party and Soviet resolutions. They were prepared in
a routine manner, often without considering the concrete situation. This
went so far that party workers, even during the smallest sessions, read
[prepared] speeches. All this produced the danger of formalising the
party and Soviet work and of bureaucratising the whole apparatus.
Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities, and the fact that he
was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces, can be
illustrated by his direction of agriculture.
All those who interested themselves even a little in the national
situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never
even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he
did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never travelled anywhere, did
not meet city and kolkhoz workers. He did not know the actual situation
in the provinces.
He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films
dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture. Many
films pictured kolkhoz life such that tables groaned from the weight of
turkeys and geese. Evidently, Stalin thought that it was actually so.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently. He always was close to
the people. He used to receive peasant delegates and often spoke at
factory gatherings. He used to visit villages and talk with the
peasants.
Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere. This
lasted ten years. The last time he visited a village was in January,
1928, when he visited Siberia in connection with grain procurements. How
then could he have known the situation in the provinces?
Once, Stalin was told during a discussion that our situation on the land
was a difficult one and that the situation in cattle breeding and meat
production was especially bad. [From this] there came a commission
charged with the preparation of a resolution called "Measures toward the
further development of animal husbandry in kolkhozes and sovkhozes." We
worked out this project.
Of course, our proposals at that time did not cover all the
possibilities. However we did chart ways in which animal husbandry on
kolkhozes and sovkhozes could be boosted. We proposed to raise livestock
prices so as to create material incentives for kolkhoz, MTS
[machine-tractor station] and sovkhoz workers in developing breeding.
But our project was not accepted, In February 1953 it was laid aside
entirely.
What is more, while reviewing this project Stalin proposed that the
taxes paid by kolkhozes and by kolkhoz workers should be raised by 40
billion roubles. According to him, the peasants were well off and a
kolkhoz worker would need to sell only one more chicken to pay his tax
in full.
Think about what this implied. Forty billion roubles is a sum which
[these workers] did not realise for all the products which they sold to
the state. In 1952, for instance, kolkhozes and kolkhoz workers received
26,280 million roubles for all products delivered and sold to the state.
Did Stalin's position, then, rest on data of any sort whatever? Of
course not. In such cases facts and figures did not interest him. If
Stalin said anything, it meant it was so - after all, he was a "genius,"
and a genius does not need to count, he only needs to look and can
immediately tell how it should be. When he expresses his opinion,
everyone has to repeat it and to admire his wisdom.
But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal to raise the
agricultural tax by 40 billion roubles? None, absolutely none, because
the proposal was not based on an actual assessment of the situation but
on the fantastic ideas of a person divorced from reality.
We are currently beginning slowly to work our way out of a difficult
agricultural situation. The speeches of the delegates to the twentieth
congress please us all. We are glad that many delegates have delivered
speeches [to the effect] that conditions exist for fulfilling the sixth
five-year plan for animal husbandry [early]: not in five years, but
within two to three years. We are certain that the commitments of the
new five-year plan will be accomplished successfully.
(Prolonged applause.)
Comrades! If we sharply criticise today the cult of the individual which
was so widespread during Stalin's life, and if we speak about the many
negative phenomena generated by this cult (which is so alien to the
spirit of Marxism-Leninism), some may ask: How could it be? Stalin
headed the party and the country for 30 years and many victories were
gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the
question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and
hopelessly hypnotised by the cult of the individual, only by those who
do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet state,
only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of
the party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society.
[Our] socialist revolution was attained by the working class and by the
poor peasantry with the partial support of middle-class peasants. It was
attained by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik party.
Lenin's great service consisted of the fact that he created a militant
party of the working class, but he was armed with Marxist understanding
of the laws of social development and with the science of proletarian
victory in the fight with capitalism, and he steeled this party in the
crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people.
During this fight the party consistently defended the interests of the
people and became its experienced leader. [The party] led the working
masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state. You
remember well the wise words of Lenin: that the Soviet state is strong
because of the awareness of the masses that history is created by the
millions and tens of millions of people.
Our historical victories were attained thanks to the party's
organisational work, to the many provincial organisations, and to the
self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the
result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as
a whole. They are not at all the fruit of Stalin's leadership, which is
how the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the
individual.
If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as Leninists, then we
have to state unequivocally that the leadership practices which came
into being during the last years of Stalin's life became a serious
obstacle in the path of Soviet social development. Stalin often failed
for months to take up some unusually important problems, concerning the
life of the party and of the state, whose solution could not be
postponed. During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other
nations were often threatened, because one-man decisions could cause,
and often did cause, great complications.
In the past few years, [after] we managed to free ourselves of the
harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper
steps in terms of internal and external policies, everyone [has been
able to see] how activity has grown before our very eyes, how the
creative activity of the broad working masses has developed, and how
favourably all this has acted upon economic and cultural development.
(Applause.)
Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the politburo? Why
did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in
time? And why is this being done only now? First of all, we have to
consider the fact that the members of the politburo viewed these matters
in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed
Stalin actively because he was one of the strongest Marxists and his
logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced [party] cadres and
party work.
It is known that after Lenin's death, especially during the first years,
Stalin actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of Leninist
theory and against those who deviated. Beginning with Leninist theory,
the party, with its central committee at the head, started on a great
scale work on the socialist industrialisation of the country, on
agricultural collectivisation, and on cultural revolution. At that time
Stalin gained great popularity, sympathy and support. The party had to
fight those who tried to lead the country away from the correct Leninist
path. It had to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites and rightists, and
bourgeois nationalists. This fight was indispensable.
Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight
eminent party and government leaders and to use terrorist methods
against honest Soviet people. As we have already shown, Stalin thus
handled such eminent party and state leaders as Kosior, Rudzutak, Eikhe,
Postyshev and many others.
Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the
opponent's falling victim to the repression. This characterised the fall
of comrade Postyshev.
In one of his [exchanges] Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with
Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?" Postyshev answered
clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik."
At first, this assertion was considered to show [merely] a lack of
respect for Stalin. Later it was considered a harmful act. Eventually it
resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and castigation as an "enemy of the
people."
In the situation which then prevailed, I often talked with Nikolay
Alexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were traveling in a car, he
said: "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his
invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know
where he will be sent next - home or to jail."
It is clear that such conditions put every member of the politburo in a
very difficult situation. And, when we also consider the fact that in
the last years central committee plenary sessions were not convened and
that sessions of the politburo occurred only occasionally, from time to
time, then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of the
politburo to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper
procedure, against serious errors and shortcomings in leadership
practices.
As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person
or in a roundabout way, without collective discussion. The sad fate of
politburo member comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's
repressions, is known to all. Characteristically, the decision to remove
him from the politburo was never discussed but was reached in a devious
fashion. In the same way came the decision regarding Kuznetsov's and
Rodionov's removals from their posts.
The importance of the central committee's politburo was reduced and its
work was disorganised by the creation within the politburo of various
commissions - the so-called "quintets", "sextets", "septets" and "nonets".
Here is, for instance, a politburo resolution from October 3, 1946:
"Stalin's proposal:
1. The politburo commission for foreign affairs ('sextet') is to concern
itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters
of internal construction and domestic policy.
2. The sextet is to add to its roster the chairman of the state
commission of economic planning of the USSR, comrade Voznesensky, and is
to be known as a septet.
Signed: secretary of the central committee, J Stalin."
What [sophistry]!
(Laughter in the hall.)
It is clear that the creation within the politburo of this type of
commissions - "quintets", "sextets", "septets" and "nonets" - was
against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was
that some members of the politburo were in this way kept away from
participation in reaching the most important state matters.
One of the oldest members of our party, Klimenty Yefremovich Voroshilov,
found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he
was actually deprived of the right of participation in politburo
sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend politburo sessions and to receive
documents. When the politburo was in session and comrade Voroshilov
heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be
allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his
dissatisfaction.
Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and
ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent.
(Laughter in the hall.)
It's true - an English agent. A special tap was installed in his home to
listen to what was said there.
(Indignation in the hall.)
By unilateral decision, Stalin had also separated one other man from the
work of the politburo - Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the
most unbridled acts of wilfulness.
Let us consider the first central committee plenum after the 19th party
congress. Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterised Vyacheslav
Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that
these old workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. We
cannot rule out the possibility that had Stalin remained at the helm for
another several months, comrades Molotov and Mikoyan probably would not
have delivered any speeches at this [20th] congress.
Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the older members of the
politburo. He often stated that politburo members should be replaced by
new ones. His proposal after the 19th congress to elect 25 persons to
the central committee presidium was aimed at the removal of old
politburo members and at bringing in less experienced persons so that
these would extol him in all sorts of ways.
We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of
the old politburo members and, in this way, a cover for all shameful
acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.
Comrades! So as not to repeat errors of the past, the central committee
has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual. We
consider that Stalin was extolled to excess. However, in the past Stalin
undoubtedly performed great services to the party, to the working class
and to the international workers' movement.
This question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have
just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and
with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary
for the defence of the interests of the working classes against the
plotting of enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp.
He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of
the interest of the labouring people, of the interest of the victory of
socialism and communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a
giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of
the party, of the working masses, in the name of the defence of the
revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!
Comrades! Lenin had often stressed that modesty is an absolutely
integral part of a real Bolshevik. Lenin himself was the living
personification of the greatest modesty. We cannot say that we have been
following this Leninist example in all respects.
It is enough to point out that many towns, factories and industrial
enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, Soviet institutions and cultural
institutions have been referred to by us with a title if I may express
it so - of private property of the names of these or those government or
party leaders who were still active and in good health. Many of us
participated in the action of assigning our names to various towns,
rayons, enterprises and kolkhozes. We must correct this.
(Applause.)
But this should be done calmly and slowly. The central committee will
discuss this matter and consider it carefully in order to prevent errors
and excesses. I can remember how Ukraine learned about Kossior's arrest.
Kiev radio used to start its programs thus: "This is Radio Kosior." When
one day the programs began without mentioning Kosior, everyone was quite
certain that something had happened to him and that he probably had been
arrested.
Thus, if today we begin to change the signs everywhere and to rename
things, people will think that these comrades in whose honour the given
enterprises, kolkhozes or cities are named also met some bad fate and
that they have also been arrested.
(Animation in the hall.)
How is the authority and the importance of this or that leader judged?
On the basis of how many towns, industrial enterprises and factories,
kolkhozes and sovkhozes carry his name. Is it not about time that we
eliminate this "private property" and "nationalise" the factories, the
industrial enterprises, the kolkhozes and the sovkhozes? (Laughter,
applause, voices: "That is right.") This will benefit our cause. After
all, the cult of the individual is manifested also in this way.
We should, in all seriousness, consider the question of the cult of the
individual. We cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially
not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here
at a closed congress session. We should know the limits; we should not
give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before
their eyes. I think that the delegates to the congress will understand
and assess properly all these proposals.
(Tumultuous applause.)
Comrades! We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once
and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both
ideological-theoretical and practical work. It is necessary for this
purpose:
First, in a Bolshevik
manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien
to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party
leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all
attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.
To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work the most
important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the
creator of history and as the creator of all material and spiritual good
of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the
revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory
of communism.
In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine
critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely
spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the
spheres of history, philosophy, economy and of other sciences, as well
as in literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in
the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our
party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist
objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book
pertaining to the events of the civil war and the great patriotic war.
Second, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the
party's central committee during the last years, a work characterised by
minute observation in all party organisations, from the bottom to the
top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterised,
above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterised
by the observance of the norms of party life described in the statutes
of our party, and, finally, characterised by the wide practice of
criticism and self-criticism.
Third, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet socialist
democracy, expressed in the constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight
wilfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts
violating revolutionary socialist legality which have accumulated during
a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the
individual has to be completely corrected.
Comrades! The 20th congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union
has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our party,
its cohesiveness around the central committee, its resolute will to
accomplish the great task of building communism.
(Tumultuous applause.)
And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic
problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alien to
Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome
consequences, is evidence of the great moral and political strength of
our party.
(Prolonged applause.)
We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical
resolutions of the 20th Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the
Leninist path to new successes, to new victories.
(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)
Long live the victorious banner of our party - Leninism!
(Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.)
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