

## **Some Remarks on the political cultures of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey**

**Heinz A. Richter**

About 30 years ago the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus invited me for the first time to this island to give me a briefing about its problems. While flying to Cyprus, somewhere over the Aegean, I did what I always do when I visit Greece - I turned on my Greek brain. Thus I arrived in Cyprus thinking in Greek categories. I vividly remember how the first PIO officer who I met, Nitsa Neofytou, made every effort to enlighten me on the basics of Cypriot politics and the Cyprus problem and how I did not understand one word because I was thinking in the Greek way (*kalamaristika*).

One year later the next invitation came. When I was flying to Cyprus this time a direct descendent of Aphrodite was sitting next to me. She was keen on a flirt. The flight passed by in a most charming manner and I forgot to switch on my Greek brain. On arrival at Larnaka airport my companion disappeared but now something strange happened: From the first day of my stay in Cyprus I noticed that I understood everything that was being explained to me by my PIO officer. After my return to Germany I began to ponder seriously on the root cause of the different experiences now and the year earlier and it was then that I learned my first fundamental lesson on Cyprus: The political culture of Cyprus is clearly European whereas the Greek motherland was still struggling to overcome the Ottoman heritage, clientelism.

In order to get a clearer picture we should first try to understand what we mean if we speak of the European political culture. In 1930 the famous Spanish cultural philosopher Ortega y Gasset stated that at a first glance the western Europeans differ widely but that taking a closer look at their theories, value system, and political aims one easily discovers that most of these stem from the common European heritage and that only a few specific features to those of an individual nation. The basis of Europeaness is the unique blend of Greek-Roman philosophy, Jewish-Christian religion, and - as is currently being rediscovered - Arab/Islamic influence. These elements have shaped the basic ethical, religious, legal and cultural ideas of the Europeans.

During the Renaissance these elements intensified their influence and led to the Reformation. The growing influence of religious confessions on politics triggered a counter-movement focussing on the individualisation of human life. New ethical values brought about by Calvinism led to the emergence of a new elite, the bourgeoisie. The mediaeval feudal order with its decentralised power structures could not adapt itself to the need for bigger economic units. Thus a revolution from above took place and produced the monarchical absolutism. Politics became more rational and the governmental administration more efficient. The Enlightenment and French revolution proclaimed the universal human rights. Rousseau's concept of the a national state based upon the sovereignty of the people, the idea of the freedom of the individual and the

right of the individual to participate in the exercise of power became an integral part of European political thinking. At about the same time political ideas such as liberalism, democracy, socialism, conservatism and nationalism came into being which ideologized politics. The concept of left-right antagonism became an accepted pattern in European politics, and political pluralism became a central feature of European political culture. The idea of multiculturalism will be another feature despite the fact that it was recently declared dead by the German Chancellor.

The process which led to this result began at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century and 300 years were needed to develop the main components. But this process was confined to western and central Europe alone. Emigrants took it to America but in Eastern Europe outside the Hapsburg empire it did not take deep roots as can still be seen today. Southeastern Europe outside the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was excluded from these developments. Just when the West was beginning its comeback the Ottomans conquered the Byzantine Empire; in 1453 Constantinople fell. As Ottoman provinces Greece and the other Balkan countries did not experience the subsequent periods of European history: Renaissance, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, Absolutism, Rationalism, Enlightenment and Bourgeois Revolution. For 400 years time almost stood still.

During those 400 years under the Ottoman Empire the subjected people in the Balkans were objects of Ottoman exploitation and repression. The only political organisation, which existed for them, was the local government based on the *muchtar* system. The *muchtars* or in Greek *kotsambashis* were the elected village presidents. These local notables slowly acquired a double function: They became the leaders and guardians of the local population and at the same time the objects of Ottoman repression if something went wrong in the sphere of their responsibility. They protected the locals from the Ottoman overlords thus gaining prestige and power in their eyes. As a *quid pro quo* for their intercession they expected loyalty from their local wards. In the course of time these notables became rich because their position and wealth acquired through their positions enabled them to obtain even more powerful positions: they became usurers.

Although this was less honest than interceding selflessly on behalf of their weaker co-villagers, money-lending was a more solid basis for the growing dependency of the peasant on the patron. The usual interest of a loan amounted to 30 percent. This patron-client structure, called the *muchtar* system, existed all over the Ottoman empire and is the historical basis of today's clientelism.

While in Western Europe a self-conscious bourgeoisie came into being which considered the state as their property, as their own bourgeois republic, for the Ottoman subjects the state was a hated foreign rule against which one had to resist. A typical act of resistance was tax avoidance and theft of state property. This attitude became a tradition which is still alive in Greece.

When in 1821 the Greek struggle for independence began these clientelistic structures were the only existing nuclei of crystallization for the political organisation of the struggle. During the struggle these structures grew horizontally and vertically forming pyramidal clientelistic networks. But since the *muchtars* did not have any military experience they had to take recourse to the leaders of the *klephtes*, honourable bandits living in the mountains outside Ottoman control. When independence came these bandit leaders became part of the clientelistic leadership and continued to conduct their trade now in politics. Thus clientelism became a system of government.

When King Otto came to Greece there was no other governmental structure. He could not run the country with the help of a handful of Bavarian civil servants, but had to take recourse to the existing clientelistic networks for ruling the country. By taking over civil administrative responsibilities the patrons gained access to the money of the state. Thus clientelism changed its character. Until then the relationship between client and patron had been more or less on a voluntary basis with a mutual advantage. Now it became a means of coercion to integrate the individual into society. The patrons began to meddle in politics and quickly learned that the clientelistic system could be used for political purposes. The patrons used their political position and power to accord favours (*rousfetia*) to their clients by stealing money which belonged to the state. These *Rousfetia* could be direct financial favours or a secure job in the civil service which thus began to be more and more inflated. In return the patrons expected their clients to vote for them in the elections.

These clientelistic networks were called parties. Until 1862 there were three such parties, a Russian, an English and a French the leaders of which considered these three powers as their patrons.. After the change of the dynasty Great Britain became the only protector of Greece and accordingly the Russian and French parties disappeared. The remaining English party became a political party but soon split into a liberal and a conservative party. But their character remained clientelistic. Both parties developed a highly refined system of favouritism, nepotism and *rousfetia*. The state became the object of exploitation by the chiefs of the respective clientelistic pyramids. Trading of posts, patronage, a spoils system and the total corruption of the state administration, the judicial system and the military were the rule. The buying of votes and the falsifying of election results were a normal feature of political life. Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a Greek deputy called this system political procurement.

The political parties which emerged in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century had nothing in common with their European counterparts except the names. Party programmes, party organization, or party congresses were unknown let alone the forming of a political will by discussion inside a party. The party was the clientele of the party leader and he alone decided about the party's course. Conflicts within a party led to the breaking off of sub-networks. Party loyalty became functional to the success of the party leader, i. e. loyalty depended on the *rousfetia* which the party leader

was able to convey to his clients. Change of power came about, when sub-networks shifted their loyalty to another party leader. In parliamentary elections the Greek voter did not vote *for* a party but *against* that party which had not done him the expected favour of *rousfeti* during the previous legislative period.

Only parties which at times form the government and gain access to the state funds play a political role. Smaller parties which never have access to the money of the state remain unimportant and small. Among them are parties which resemble their European counterparts but they don't stand a chance in this system. Clientelism survived even in the great crises of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it proved to be so deeply rooted in society that it was able to force the two central ideologies of the century to adapt itself to it. In the Balkans Fascism became clientelistic fascism, i.e. the ideological features were taken over but modified. Instead of creating fascist mass parties which would have been alien to the system the people as a whole were declared the clientele of the fascist leader. The same happened with the communist dictatorships after World War II. Ceaucescu's system, for example, can be described as clientelistic communism.

Another feature of Greek clientelism is the tax exemption of the rich. The political and economic oligarchies, which are closely interwoven, see to it that the upper classes remain tax-free and thus they can enrich themselves. The biggest part of public revenue stems from indirect taxation and wage tax which is paid by ordinary people. Greece never became industrialized like the western European countries. The economical focus lay on agriculture, tourism, trade, shipping and the shadow economy. This led to a chronic scarcity of jobs and consequently to emigration or labour migration. In order to bind their clients closely to the respective ruling party jobs were created in the public sector which in turn became extremely inflated. Today every fourth employment is in the civil service. As an overdue reduction of the number of public servants would lead to the loss of votes both parties avoid it at all cost.

The inflated state apparatus produced high government spending. Several national bankruptcies did not lead to a more cautious restricted financial course. The oligarchy knew that there would always be a saviour who, out of strategic or ideological considerations, would come to the rescue of Athens. From 1862 till 1947 this role had been played by Great Britain. Then the US took over in a kind of *translatio imperii* in the framework of the Truman doctrine. In the 1980s the EU assumed this responsibility. Thus the Greek oligarchy was reassured that Greece would never be let down by its protectors and friends.

After World War II and the Civil War there were, a ruling network called ERE, under Karamanlis, and an opposition network, based on George Papandreou's Centre Union. The short period of rule under Papandreou did not change anything and the dictatorship from 1967 to 1974 was a repetition of clientelistic fascism. When the junta fell in 1974. Karamanlis returned and revived the old clientelistic party of the right, calling it *Nea Dimokratia*. When Andreas Papandreou returned to power, he deliberately left aside all the plans for the creation

of a programme party, despite the fact that he had participated in the discussion about the reform of the Greek political system and about the necessity of the creation of a new party of the European type (*evropaikou typou*). He founded a new left party, PASOK. However, this party was from the beginning nothing but a clientelistic network, with A. Papandreou as its patron.

During the rule of Konstantinos Karamanlis lasting until 1981 clientelism worked in the traditional way. The conservatives did not exaggerate the clientelistic *rousfeti* system. Karamanlis greatest achievement was Greece's entry into the EU. But when PASOK came to power in 1981 things changed radically. PASOK was in power for the first time and many of its leading cadres stemmed from the lower strata of society who had never had access to the funds of the state, and felt huge unsatisfied demands. If PASOK had only access to the limited funds stemming from Greek tax revenue the resulting damage would have been limited.

But Andreas Papandreou considered the EU funds as an unlimited source for the distribution of *rousfeti*. EU money was fed into the clientelistic system in an unprecedented way. When Mitsotakis and his Nea Dimokratia took over in 1990, not much changed, and on Papandreou's return to power in 1993, the distribution of *rousfeti* on the basis of EU money reached a climax. When in 1996 A. Papandreou had to resign over financial scandals Kostas Simitis, a German trained lawyer, took over.

Until 2004, Simitis made great efforts to reduce clientelism, but discovered that the clientelistic system was too strong. Despite the fact that he was prime minister and head of PASOK he could not control the clientelistic network. His misfortune showed clearly that the clientelistic system had again changed its character. It was no longer a monolithic pyramid under the control of the patron on top, but a network with influential sub-patrons who could distribute *rousfeti* on their own, because they themselves had direct access to necessary funds of the Greek state or of the EU. When the conservatives returned to power in 2004 this tendency became even stronger. The new generation of their leaders considered it legitimate to enrich themselves and their followers in an even more unprecedented way.

Had this process been confined to Greek taxes and EU funds Greece would not have faced this unprecedented bankruptcy. But membership in the EU and especially the participation in the Euro system opened the door to cheap money. For the last Drachma loan Greece had paid 8 percent interest. Now cheap money lead to a life on credit. The end of the road is known - the Greek bankruptcy. Unlike Spain or Portugal where a house building bubble exploded in Greece this money was not invested but went into consumption and the pockets of the oligarchy. For almost two decades Greece encountered an unprecedented prosperity but it was a prosperity on credit. It is an open secret in Greece that a great part of this money still exists on bank accounts outside Greece.

The remedies recommended by the European specialists showed clearly that they had not the

slightest idea about the real problem of Greece. The Greeks themselves know what clientelism is despite the fact that there has been no word for it in the Greek language. They speak of clientelistic relations (pelatiakes scheseis) but this describes only a local or special social relationship not an elaborate system as it exists in Greece. I invented the necessary word - pelatiasmos - enabling the Greeks to recognize the system character of clientelism, call it by its name and start searching for alternatives.

Georgios Papandreou could not master the crisis and the change to the present coalition government is even more counterproductive because the two clientelistic parties will unite their forces to defend the system from which both profit. Any reform which will weaken their access to funds of the state will be torpedoed. Apparently the Greek oligarchy believes that the EU will save them as others did in the past without any obligation to reform the clientelistic system. As the EU leaders do not understand the Greek system they will probably save Greece from the catastrophe. But by doing so they will reanimate the dying clientelistic system. Once this happens the clientelistic game can go on.

The only way to overcome the clientelistic system is to dry up the financial sources for the rousfetia. The moment the clientelistic parties have no longer access to these funds they will die. Additionally a great number of permanent jobs must be created so that people are no longer obliged to beg politicians for jobs in the public sector. This can only be achieved with EU help. But where are the experts who know the tricks and the methods of clientelism? The aim must be to make the stealing of money from the state a crime and not a sport. Open minded Greeks know this and look enviously towards the Republic of Cyprus where such problems do not exist.

It is indeed fascinating to see how two former parts of the Ottoman empire developed so differently. Greece became independent in 1830 and Cyprus came into the British orbit in 1878. One can safely assume that the starting conditions were identical. Indeed, the muchtar system existed in Cyprus as well, and these village notables were also usurers. But as there was no struggle for independence against the Ottomans, the first basic feature of Greek clientelism, the organization of horizontal and vertical clientelistic networks did not exist. Additionally klephtes had never existed in Cyprus. The British masters had a long experience in colonial administration and integrated the Cypriot notables into their system by creating a kind of co-determination organ, the Legislative Council. The members of this council were usurers, merchants and owners of large estates, i.e. exactly the same social strata out of which clientelism came into being in Greece.

However, there was one decisive difference: There existed a second power structure the British colonial administration, which efficiently controlled the finances of the state. The British wisely kept the Cypriot notables away from the state funds. Thus they could not distribute rousfetia on the basis of stolen money. Of course, they conveyed rousfetia to their

followers but these were of a totally different kind, they were personal favours. Thus the Cypriot oligarchy was never able to create a hierarchical clientelistic network like in Greece. Additionally the British withdrew enormous sums out of Cyprus to pay the interest of the so-called Cyprus Tribute to the British shareholders. For many years Cyprus remained a very poor country.

When at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century agriculture began to grow and the peasants were in need of investment capital the hour of the usurer seemed to come. But the British ruined their game by creating the agricultural cooperative movement in 1914. In 1925 they added the agricultural bank (agrotiki trapeza). Its low interest loans (8 percent) rang the death knell for the money lenders who took over 30 percent. A debt conversion in the early 1940s freed the peasants families from inherited debts. Thus, clientelism died in Cyprus before it had had a chance to grow. The usurers and moneylenders gave up exploiting the peasantry, left the villages, went to the towns and became - honest merchants or entrepreneurs, some even bankers. Their economic activities created jobs and laid the foundation to the later rise of Cyprus to a flourishing country, when independence came in 1960.

Of course there exists clientelism in Cyprus but it is the European type which is totally different from the Greek one. Cypriots of both societies are convinced that this political phenomenon exists in Cyprus. From their point of view, this is correct but those who argue in this way do not know the clientelistic system in Greece or in Turkey. Cypriots who betake themselves to Athens or Istanbul to stay for a longer period suffer a kind of “political cultural shock” when they encounter the clientelism of the so-called parent countries. Cypriot clientelism resembles the kind of clientelism which we know in the EU as well. European clientelism contains elements of favouritism, nepotism, rope teams, wheeling and dealing. In Germany the liberals are a typical example of this kind of a clientelistic party. Their clients are dentists, lawyers, hoteliers, etc.. But these machinations are exceptional and irregular and they do not form a complete comprehensive system as in Greece or Turkey.

The Cypriot political parties closely resemble their European counterparts. They are parties with programs and internal democracy and member networks. But they are not clientelistic networks of rivalling party patrons. Deputies are not distributors or managers of rousfetia. Of course patronage exists as it does in Europe. Corruption is not a venial sin or a popular sport but a violation of the law which is prosecuted. Corruption violates the well functioning code of honour which was taken over from the British. A gentleman does not do such a thing. In case someone is caught transgressing this rule he is punished in a double way, by the law and by social proscription. This reaction reminds one of the notorious Profumo case in Britain.

In Cyprus public opinion reacts in a rather sensitive and negative way to violations of ethical standards. The Auditor General is highly respected and has a power which goes far beyond that what we are accustomed in Germany. Criticism by him leads to severe consequences which

include even the loss of the job. In 1991 the office of the ombudsman was created which is respected in a similar way. The Republic of Cyprus took over the British ideal of a civic culture and preserved it better than Britain did. Primary virtues of British society such as punctuality, efficiency, honesty, politeness, fairness, tolerance, reliability, correctness were taken over and are practised in an astonishing way in daily life. But the Cypriot society is not a simple copy of the British, it has the Mediterranean temperament and charm. At the same time it is target oriented. Muddling through is no Cypriot concept as has been demonstrated during the present crisis. The Cypriot society is not class oriented as the British is. There are almost no class cleavages and thus almost no class barriers. The society of Cyprus is indeed a typical civic society.

For many centuries religion played a major role in Greece and in Cyprus. The orthodox church was one of the main factors which helped to preserve the Greek identity during Ottoman rule. In Cyprus the archbishop of the autocephalous church was not only the spiritual head of the Greek Cypriots but also the leader of the ethnic group, the ethnarch. After the death of Archbishop Makarios III who was the last towering figure in the history of the Cypriot church the church lost much of its traditional importance. Today in both Cypriot societies religion is a private matter, just as in Europe. Though the archbishops have been fighting against this they did not succeed in regaining the ground lost. Their mingling in daily politics provokes growing sceptical criticism. A similar development can be observed in the northern part of the island. The Turkish Cypriot society is an enlightened one. Islamic fundamentalism is incompatible with the Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately this is not the case among the numerous Turkish and Kurdish immigrants. There is even the danger that the enlightened Islam of the Turkish Cypriots which might have become a model of a Euro-Islam will disappear.

The educational system of the Republic is very efficient although it depends on Greece to a certain degree. As the number of students is relatively small the market for textbooks would be rather small. Therefore the publishing of Cypriot textbooks would be too expensive. Thus textbooks produced in Greece are used so are the curricula. But unlike the students in Greece Cypriot students speak the languages they are taught at school. Private swot schools as in Greece (*frontistiria*) which teach the stuff which the students do not learn at the regular schools do not exist. Without these swot shops no Greek student would reach the finals (*panellinies*). Graduates of the Cypriot secondary schools can continue their studies at European universities without encountering any kind of cultural shock. The Cyprus University itself has reached European standards. It could have become a very attractive European scientific outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East if teaching would be in today's *lingua franca* English. But out of an anti-colonial reflex the founding law decreed that the teaching languages should be Greek and Turkish. Thus cooperation with European universities is difficult.

There are other characteristic elements which prove the proximity of Cyprus to Europe.

Cypriot state and private enterprise planners are used to develop long term concepts which are realized over years. Thus the Cypriot economy is booming and Cyprus became a net-payer of the EU, i.e. Cyprus pays more into the common EU fund than it receives. A shadow economy does not exist in Cyprus. The growth of the Cypriot economy after the catastrophe of 1974 can only be compared with the German economic miracle of the 1950s. Cypriot administrative bureaucracy is pretty efficient. Whoever knows the Greek counterpart which reminds one of Kafka's novel the "Schloss" praises the Cypriot administration. But despite of all economic successes ecology plays an important role in Cypriot thinking. There is a green party and violations of the environment provoke protests. The Cypriot trade unions are divided in a left and right wing but both are democratic and function in the same way as their European equivalents.

Another feature of the political culture of the Greek Cypriots is their strong sense of solidarity. When in 2011 the electrical power plant was damaged by that ammunition explosion the population almost unanimously agreed that one had to save electricity to overcome the shortage. A similar reaction could be observed when due to lack of rain the island developed a shortage of water. Everybody tried to save water. This sense of solidarity enabled the Cypriots in the past to overcome the catastrophe of 1974 when one third of the population became refugees. In a breathtaking short period of time the tents of the refugees disappeared. It is this sense of solidarity which will enable the Cypriots to overcome the problems of the present crisis.

When civil war destroyed Lebanon as a Near Eastern financial centre Cyprus took over this role. It became a kind of Luxemburg in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Cypriot banks were so successful that their financial volume surpassed by far that of the Cypriot traditional economy. It was even bigger than the national gross domestic product. For many years this was very positive for Cyprus but last year trouble began when the Greek crisis began. The Cypriot banks held huge numbers of Greek government bonds in their portfolio. When in spring 2011 it became clear that there would be a kind of haircut down to 80 percent the Cypriot government reacted accordingly and prepared to cope with these losses of the banks. When the catastrophe grew worse the Government reacted adequately and responsibly. There is no doubt that Cyprus will master the crisis despite the irresponsible downgrading by Standard and Poor. This, however, will need some time.

In Greek Cypriot history there was only one event which reminded of clientelism. I am talking of the period immediately after independence in 1960 when a new administration of trustworthy people had to be built and many fighters of EOKA found their way into highly qualified positions. But even in this case Cyprus was lucky because only a very small number of persons proved unsuitable.

It would be easy and pleasant to add more examples proving the European character of the Greek Cypriot society but what about the Turkish Cypriot society? 30 years ago I would have given an immediate answer stating that the Turkish Cypriots are as Europeanized as their Greek compatriots. Developments since then oblige me to differentiate my judgement. But in order to arrive at a clear judgment we should take a look at the situation when the British arrived.

For roughly three centuries the Turks had been the rulers of the island. When the British took over they lost their power and became an 18 percent minority. In order not to be suppressed by the majority they closely leaned on the colonial power. One might almost call this a clientelistic relationship. Like their Greek compatriots the Turkish Cypriots became increasingly Europeanized. They, too, developed a European mentality. During the EOKA struggle their attachment to Britain became even stronger because they feared enosis. The British misused this allegiance and made the Turkish Cypriots fight against their Greek compatriots. When independence came Makarios was not ready to accept them as equal partners as the highly complicated constitution demanded (absolute veto of the president and vice-president) but wanted to reduce them to a 18 percent minority. This attitude triggered trouble, led to the unrest in 1963-64 and made the Turkish Cypriot leadership look for another protector - Turkey.

Turkey which since the middle of the 1950s had wanted to divide the island between her and Greece now saw a chance to meddle into Cypriot politics. Turkey became the foreign protector, the patron of the Turkish Cypriots. On the island the Turkish government found political leaders ready to become tools of Ankara's politics e. g. Küçük and the late Rauf Denktaş. However, there were still forces in the Turkish Cypriot society who wanted inter-communal cooperation. The close cooperation of Greek and Turkish Cypriot in AKEL and the left Trade Union was an outstanding example. But the coup of 1974 engineered by the Athens junta and the subsequent Turkish invasion and the de facto partition of the island led to deep reaching changes. Northern Cyprus did not only become a client of Turkey but a kind of Turkish province. This did not change even when Denktaş tried to make Northern Cyprus an independent state. The currency remained the Turkish lira. Decisions are not taken by the so-called ministries or government but by the Turkish embassy in Northern Nicosia. Only Denktaş was able to make independent moves, sometimes.

In order to change the population balance in favour of the Turkish Cypriots Ankara initiated a migration movement to the island. As this coincided with an emigration movement of the Turkish Cypriots towards Europe, mainly to Britain, the Turkish Cypriots today are a minority in their own country. The immigration of Turks and recently more and more Kurds changed not only the composition of the population but also the political culture. They imported the strong clientelistic structures of Turkey. The process of clientelization of society had already started after the invasion. On the basis of confiscated Greek Cypriot property Denktaş and his National Union Party were able to distribute real substantial *rousfetia* thus acquiring the loyalty

of the receivers of those favours. Later when the distributing of Greek property ended, Ankara stepped in and funded the regime. Jobs were created in the administration paid for by Turkish money. This inflated the public sector in an unprecedented way. Allegedly today 50 percent of all jobs existing in the Northern part of the island are in the public sector. Without Turkish money the administration would collapse within a very short time.

It is evident that only these parties, which came to power for some time, had the advantage of this system. These parties are clientelistic networks and have nothing in common with parties in the Republic of Cyprus or Europe. These parties are controlled from Turkey. When one of the opposition parties came to power its leader soon discovered that he had only little scope. The present government under Eroglu is a kind of stooge of Ankara. The parties of the opposition forces in the North of Cyprus are parties in the European sense but have remained small and powerless.

Thus, we can conclude that the political cultures in the two parts of Cyprus are drifting apart. The political culture in the Turkish Cypriot society is moving away from Europe towards Turkey. This forms another serious obstacle for a possible reunification. Even if Ankara agreed that the two parts of Cyprus should be re-united the question arises whether it will be possible to unite two political units with such different political cultures into one state. How big these problems are can be seen in the case of Greece and the EU. I could imagine that if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were left alone they might find a reasonable compromise but will this be possible with the newcomers in the North? Even though by nature I am an optimist in this case I am rather pessimistic.

Before I come to the end of my analysis I would like to make a few remarks on the political culture of Turkey. There is not the slightest doubt that the political culture of Turkey is based on clientelism. For many years the Kemalist clientelistic network controlled the country. Now the AKP, another clientelistic network, runs the country. The Kemalists's clients were the secular urban masses in the West of Turkey. AKP relies on the pious masses in the countryside. The present economic growth is caused by the AKP investments in these areas which triggered a boom. While PASOK encouraged consumption AKP encourages economic investment and thus the creation of jobs for the masses.

There is another astonishing feature of Turkish clientelism. There is no tax evasion. In the Turkish media rich people and companies are praised for the huge sums they contributed to the state budget. Rich people are praised for their donations given to the public. A good hundred years ago this habit existed in Greece as well. Gennadios donated a library and Averof a cruiser, but unfortunately this tradition is almost dead. Turks are proud of their state. In schools every morning the famous slogan of Atatürk is recited: "I am proud to be a Turk." The idea to steal money from the state is incompatible with Turkish mentality. For the Turks their republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) has the same connotation as the word republic in Europe. In Turkish it

means the matter of the people which comes very close to the Roman concept of *res publica* from which the word republic is derived. This word exists in all European languages except one - Greek. This is astonishing that neither in ancient nor in modern Greek there is a word for republic. Instead one uses *dimokratia* which thus acquires a double meaning: democracy and republic. If one wants to show the difference to monarchy one says uncrowned democracy (*avasilefti dimokratia*). As the Greek Cypriots grow up bilingual, Greek and English, they understand the meaning of the Republic of Cyprus. The Republic is their state.

On the basis of this mentality I expect that the Cypriots will overcome the present crisis and that the Cypriot EU-presidency will be a great success.